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SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 1919
Introduction Contours and cleavages in Ukrainian Marxism
The Nezalezhnyky or Independentists crystallised as a faction of the Uk-
 rainian Social Democratic Workers Party (USDRP) in December 1918, 
re-organised as the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) they remained 
active until March 1925. The process which culminated in the formation 
of the Nezalezhnyky has traditionally been located in the clash of con-
tending perspectives of the Ukrainian Revolution. However the Neza-
lezhny ky did not consider themselves a split as such but heirs to the Uk-
rainian Marxist tradition, with a history stretching “from the Revolutio-
nary Uk rainian Party (1900–1905) through the USDRP (1905–1919) and 
fi nally UKP, which is its revolutionary successor”.1 
From its beginnings Ukrainian Marxism had to come to grips with 
the national question. Devoid of self-government and partitioned between 
two rival powers, on the eve of the revolution the majority of Ukraine 
had been held by Russia in a colonial position for two and half centuries, 
the perplexities of national liberation intimately connected with the eman-
cipation of labour from both a social structure still characterised by a 
feudal nature and the relations of capitalism. 2
  1 Lyst TsK Vikonomy Kominternu Pro Vzayemovidnostini Mizh UKP i KP(b)U, (27 
August 1924), Dokumenti Trahichnoii Istorii Ukraini (1917–1927), Bachinskyi P. 
ed, Kyiv 1999, p. 523
  2 But contrary to the prognosis of some, such as Georgi Plekhanov, the develop-
ment of capitalism did not render permanent its status as a so-called ‘non-historic’ 
nation. See: Volodomyr Levynsky, L’internatonale socialiste et les peuples op-
p rimes, Prague, 1920, Roman, Rosdolsky, Engels and the ‘Nonhistoric’ Peoples: 
the National Question in the Revolution of 1848, Glasgow, 1987.
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The rapid development of capitalism in Ukraine was not organic but 
fashioned within the colonial nexus; Western capital holding co-res pon-
sibility with Russian imperialism in the exploitation of Ukraine, un der-
pin ning the antagonism of the European capitalist states to Ukrainian 
independence.3 This capitalism from above impacted on both the social 
class composition and the state-labour relations. The working class bore 
the stigmata of colonialism; manifested by stratifi cation, with the pre-
dominance of an upper layer drawn from migrant Russian or Russifi ed 
labour.4 This social differentiation posited the national question at the 
point of production through a division of labour which relegated the ma-
jority Ukrainians element to the low paid, fl exible labour strata, over-
represented in the service, unskilled and agricultural sectors. It was in 
the latter that the agrarian and national questions became enmeshed in 
a volatile combination.5 Correspondingly the ruling classes, were over-
whelmingly non-Ukrainian.6 
As opposed to transcending the fragmentation fostered by capital the 
Social Democratic movement ran along these fault lines, unable to agree 
on terms of unity. The Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDRP) 
demanded the subordination of all Marxists to a single party – their own. 
As a corollary their leaders supported assimilation of workers into the 
Russian nation as historically progressive and refused to challenge the 
  3 Karl Kautsky summed up Ukraine’s predicament: Capitalism develops in only 
one dimension for the Ukrainian people – it proletarianises them, while the other 
dimension – the fl owering of the productive forces, the accumulation of surplus 
and wealth – is mainly for the benefi t of other countries. Because of this, capital-
ism reveals to Ukrainians only its negative, revolutionizing dimension... it does not 
lead to an increase in their wealth. Cited in Bojcun, The Working Class and the 
National Question, p. 71
  4 On this aspect of the division of labour see: Andrii Richtysky, ‘Memorandum Uk-
rainskoi Kumunistichnoi Partii Kongresovi III Komunistychnoho Internationalu’, 
Nova Doba, no.4, 1920. Marko Bojcun, ‘Approaches to the Study of the Ukraini-
an revolution’, Journal of Ukrainian Studies Vol. 24: 1 (summer 1999), Friedgut, 
Iuzovka and Revolution, Vol.I, p. 208-144.
  5 See, H.R Weinstein, ‘Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine 1905-1917’, 
The Journal of Economic History, Vo.2, No.1, May 1942, p. 26-28. 
  6 See M. Volobuiev, Do problemy ukrainskoyi ekonomiky, in Dokumenty ukrainsko-
ho komunizmy, Ivan Maistrenko Ed, (Prolog Publishers, New York, 1962), p. 154
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integrity of the Russian Empire.7 In contrast the Ukrainian Marxists took 
up the national question as an immediate task of the labour movement, 
considering that the advent of communist society would promote spring-
time of nations and national culture. Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–
1951) coined the phrase vsebichne vyzvolennia, the ‘universal (social, na-
tional, political, moral, cultural, etc.) liberation’ of the worker and peas-
ant masses; ‘such a total and radical liberation’ represented the objec-
tives of ‘Ukrainian Revolution’.8 The question of the weight of emphasis on 
the social and national spheres proved to be repeated source of tension.9 
Conversely, as a theory of liberation in a subjugated nation this stand 
strengthened the more emancipatory attributes of Ukrainian Marxism.10 
  7 There is no complete study of the Ukrainian question in these debates. Works 
which cover this period include: V. Levynsky, L’internatonale socialiste et les 
peuples opprimes, Vienna, 1920, A. Karpenko, Lenin’s Theory of The National 
Question And Its Contradictions, META, 2 No.3-4, 1979, M. Yurkevich, ‘A Fore-
runner of National Communism: Lev Yurkevych (1885–1918), Journal of Ukrain-
ian Studies. 7:1, spring 1982. Lenin’s Struggle For Revolutionary International, 
Monad, 1986, Lev Rybalka (Yurkevych) ‘Rosiiski marksysty i ukrainskyi rukh’, Dzvin 
7-8. 1913, 
  8 V. Vynnychenko, Rozlad i pohodzhennia, cited in Ivan L.Rudnytsky, Essays in Mo-
dern Ukrainian History, Edmonton, 1987, p. 419.
  9 Symptomatic was the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP). Mykola Mikhnovsky 
prioritising independence, led a split in 1902 his ideas being branded “zoological 
nationalism”. The RUP fractured again in 1905, with Ukrainian Social Democrat-
ic Union or Spilka led by M. Melenevsky-Basok forming an autonomous section 
of the RSDRP (Mensheviks). The Spilka saw the national question as an auxi liary 
issue. Though initially successful Spilka was relegated to the role of peasant or-
ganisers and suggested it becomes an All-Russian section. See: George Y. Bo shyk, 
The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia 1900–1907. With Special Refr-
erence to Social Democracy, PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 1981. 
10 Such universalist concepts permeated the perspectives of Ukrainian Social Democ-
racy since its genesis in the First International with the “precursor of Uk rainian 
Marxism” Serhii Podolynsky (1850–1891) articulated a vision of a “future socialist 
order of an “egalitarian association of the workers” which would “transfer land to 
the peasant communes and of the factories to the workers artels”. Similarly Marx 
had emphasised that the peasant commune could be saved by serving as a ‘point 
of departure’ within a communist revolution in Russia, the success of which was 
conditional upon a corresponding “proletarian revolution in the West”. Given such 
a linkage Russia could avoid going through the vicissitudes of capitalism. In con-
trast to Plekhanov economic determinist antagonism to the peasant commune and 
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It was enriched by being open to other currents; which signifi cantly de-
viated, at times unacknowledged, from the constraints of the established 
Marxism.11 They criticised the Great Russian Marxists for “limiting them-
selves to an ideological connection exclusively with the labour movement 
of Germany.”12 The left-wing leader of the USDRP Lev Yurkevych (1884–
1919) summarized their views in the following terms:
A second constitutional congress of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party took 
place in 1905 and adopted the maximum Erfurt programme of the German 
Social-Democrats and the minimum programme of the Russian Social-Democ-
racy. It demanded extreme democratic autonomy for the territory within the 
ethnographic boundaries of Ukraine, with legal guarantees for the free devel-
opment for the national minorities living within its territory. The principle of 
national organization was based on the organizational model of the Austrian 
Social-Democracy. With regard to tactics, the Revolutionary Uk rai ni an Party 
took the same position as the left wing of the Russian Social-Democracy (Bolshe-
viks), and instead of calling itself the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, adopted 
the name Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, the name under which 
it still exists today, and to which the authors of this letter belong.13
The cleavages and class composition of Ukrainian society negated the 
feasibility of the bourgeoisie acting as the unifying ethico-political force 
statist and authoritarian conception of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. On Po-
dolynsky see: ‘Socialism and the Uni ty of Physical Forces’, Serhii Podolynsky Trans-
lated by Angelo Di Salvo and Mark Hudson Organization Environment, March 
2004, USA, , In defense of an independent Ukrainian socialist movement: Three 
letters from Serhii Podolynsky to Valerian Smirnov’, Roman Serbyn. Journal of 
Ukrainian Studies, 1982, Ro man [Prokopovych, T] Rosdolsky, , ‘Fridrykh Engels 
pro Ukrainu’, Chervony Shlyakh, No.78, Kharkiv, (1927), p. 186. .
11 Comparitive studies the socialist movement in Ireland, Italy, Hungary and France. 
The Agrarian Program of the French Workers Party was republished as an RUP 
pamphlet with an introduction by D.Antonovych in 1903. Werner Sombarts So-
cialism and the Social Movement was republished by Moloda Ukraina in Galicia 
in 1899. 
12 Lev Yurkevych, Peredmova, V Levinsky, Narys Rozvytki Ukrainskoho Rukh v Ha-
lychnyia, Dzvin, Kyiv (1914).
13 Lev Rybalka [Yurkevych] L’Ukraine Et La Guerre, Lettre Ouvre adresee a la 2nd 
conference socialiste internationale tenue en Hollande en mai 1916, Edition du 
journal social-democrate Ukrainyen ‘Borotba’ Lausanne 1916, p. 21.
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that could reconstitute the nation.14 It followed as a ‘nation of workers 
and peasants’ with ‘no nationally conscious bourgeoisie’, the hegemonic 
role should correspond to its character, making the emancipation of la-
bour integral to the quest for national liberation.15 The USDRP theo-
rists attempted to develop such a perspective, reaching beyond those or-
thodoxies which had predetermined a bourgeois ascendancy, concurrently 
the founding theorist of the USDRP, Mykola Porsh (1877–1944) conclud-
ed: “Thus only the proletariat can assume the leadership in the struggle 
for autonomy the Ukrainian national movement will not be a bourgeois 
movement of triumphant capitalism as in the case of the Czechs. It will 
be more like the Irish case, a proletarian and semi-proletarianised peas-
ant movement.”16 A theme echoed by Yurkevych, who wrote the “move-
ment has connected the question of national liberation to all the prob-
lems of the emancipation of the proletariat”, which he concluded “ap-
pears as the sole revolutionary and democratic power.17
Yet by the time of the revolution in 1917 these ideas which formed the 
mainstream of the USDRP had been dislodged; now forming one part 
of spectrum of opinion. This had obvious consequences, an explanation 
of how this came about can be found in the period of reaction when the 
entire Social Democratic movement went into decline. In their reports to 
the conferences of the Second International the USDRP Central Com-
mittee described a “retrogression of the Party and its organizations”, a 
growing infl uence of “bourgeois nationalist ideas” was causing a hemor-
rhaging, notably of the intelligentsia to cultural institutions and de-po-
liticised nationalism.18 The leadership challenged this trend as in ‘sharp 
14 For a discussion of Gramsci and the people-nation see: Luis M. Pozo, ‘The Roots 
of Hegemony: The Mechanisms of Class Accommodation and the Emergence of 
the Nation-people’, Capital & Class, 91, 2007.
15 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, Vol.II, Kyiv-Vienna, 1920. p. 102.
16 Mykola Porsh, Avtonomiyu Ukrainy, Kyiv 1907. 
17 Lev Rybalka L’Ukraine Et L Guerre, 22.
18 This was cited in the report to the conference of the Second International, in Co-
penhagen at which Yurkevych attended as the USDRP delegate, see: Bericht der 
Ukrainischen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei in Russland an den Interna-
tionalen Sozialistischen Kongress in Kopenhagen, Lemberg 1910, p. 5 
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contradiction to the revolutionary tradition of our party’.19 Whilst on a 
formal level they were successful it did not stop the corrosion, hindering 
efforts at regenerating the Party.20 With the First World War these diver-
gences became acute; a majority of USDRP leaders opposed the war, a mi-
nority adopted either a pro-Russian or a pro-Austrian orientation along 
with the Ukrainian Social Democrats in Galicia.21 Efforts to uphold prin-
ciples that “really correspond to the USDRP traditions” were led by Bo-
rot ba edited by Yurkevych in Geneva.22 Supporting the anti-war Zimmer-
wald movement, Borotba declared: “Above all, we should not take sides, 
not besmirch our revolutionary cause in showing solidarity with the war 
aims of any of the governments involved”.23 It called for a new Interna-
tional where “the liberation of Ukraine will be the watchword of the Third 
International, and of the proletarian socialists of Europe, in their strug-
gle against Russian imperialism.”24 On the eve of the revolution there were 
19 The USDRP CC reported: “A central task will be to develop our national class pol-
itics opposed to the Ukrainian bourgeois national movement and opposed to these 
intellectuals in the party which had sympathy for this Ukrainian bourgeois na-
tional movement.” Bericht der Ukrainischen Sozialdemokratischen Ar beiter-Par-
tei, p. 13. Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) himself was expelled
20 Yurkevych bemoaned: “The Ukrainian Marxist intelligentsia has almost no inter-
est in a workers’ press. Our generation, carelessly and without perspectives of its 
own, has gotten involved in Ukrainian bourgeois affairs. Its path and that of the 
Ukrainian workers’ movement have parted ways apparently forever.” Lev Yur-
kevch, Paki I paki (V spravi Ukrainskoi robitnychoi hazety), Dzvin 4, 1913.
21 The majority of USDRP leaders opposed the war, a minority adopted a pro-Rus-
sian or a pro-Austrian orientation the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was 
formed by Melenevskyi and former General Secretary of the USDRP Andrii Zhuk. 
See: Roman Rosdolsky, ‘Do istorii Soiuzu vyavolennia Ukrainy’, Ukrains’kyi sa-
mostiinyk, May 1 (1969). 
22 P. Diatliv a Central Committee of the USDRP wrote to Levynsky defending his 
anti-war stance being espoused by Yurkevych: Thus, your statement that the views 
of Borotba are the personal views of “Mr. Rybalka” [Yurkevych] is contrary to the 
fact. … But you, comrade, as a person familiar with the programme and tactics of 
our party, undoubtedly know that the views of Borotba really correspond to the 
USDRP traditions.” D. Doroshenko, Z Istorii Ukrainskoi Politychnoi Dumky Za 
Chasiv Svitovoi Viini, Praha, 1936, p. 62.
23 Borotba, Number 4. September 1915. “War or Revolution?”, pp. 3-6 
24 Rybalka L’Ukraine Et L Guerre, 54.
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not only deep divergences within the Ukrainian but with the Russian So-
cial Democracy.25 The USDRP had grown closer too the Bolsheviks dur-
ing 1913–1917, but on repeated occasions they could not resolve their dif-
ferences on the national question.26 In a comprehensive critique of the 
RSDRP in January 1917, Yurkevych argued that by holding to two mutu-
ally exclusive propositions, the “right of nations to self-determination” 
with a preference for large states and centralism, it “destroys within them 
the capacity to consider the national question from a genuinely interna-
tionalist point of view”.27 Asserting: “In the whole course of their activity 
they have never come out on Ukrainian soil against national oppression”.28 
Yurkevych appealed that if they were sincere they should “at least refrain 
from hindering the Ukrainian proletariat in the struggle for its own na-
tional liberation”.29 
The ideas of Borotba did resonate in the USDRP revival, though Yur-
ke vych was never able to participate, he was terminally ill and paralysed 
in Moscow until his death in 1919.30 His absence certainly contributed to 
25 Yurkevych had secured broad support including in the RSDRP, his sympathisers 
included Leon Trotsky, Maniulsky, and the left group Vperyod. 
26 Furthermore we connect with the Bolsheviks in their decisive fi ght against social 
patriotism. The endeavors of the Mensheviks to cover up the pestilence of social 
patriotism, which during the war was revealed in all its shocking nakedness in the 
whole Socialist International, only presents an echo of world opportunism – and 
we have to declare war on this if we want to save socialism from a new intellectual 
catastrophe. Whoever claims that the Bolsheviks are the tendency of ‘splitters’ just 
because they stand for the curing of the International from the infection of patri-
otism, has either not grasped the huge signifi cance of the current crisis of world 
socialism, or are themselves infected with this patriotic disease. Russian Social De-
mocracy and us, Borotba, No.2, April 1915
27 L. Rybalka, Russkie Sotsialdemokrat’i i Natsional’ii Vopros, Geneva (Borotba, 1917). 
Republished in Russian and Ukrainian, edited by Ivan Maistrenko, (Sucanist, Mu-
nich 1969). All quotations are from the English translation by Myroslav Yurkevich, 
L. Rybalka, The Russian Social Democrats and the National Question, Journal of Uk-
rainian Studies. 7:1 (spring 1982), 57-78. Rybalka, Russian Social Democrats, 59.
28 Rybalka, Russian Social Democrats, 77.
29 Rybalka, Russian Social Democrats P. 78
30 In particular the Petrograd and Moscow USDRP committee, journal Nashe zhyt-
tia, this committee
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the changed complexion of the Party which rapidly revived. Dmytro Do-
ro shenko (1882–1951) characterised the confl ict which had surfaced in 
the Ukrainian movement as between “two principles: the state-national and 
the social-international”.31 To the revolutionary social democrats these 
were false-opposites, the former dismembering an integrated class based 
perspective. When the USDRP revived it embraced not only former mem-
bers’ energised youth and workers, but crucially those who fragmented 
in the preceding years unchanged in their outlook.32
Dialectics of the Ukrainian revolution
The fi rst phase of the Ukrainian revolution spanned from the February 
Revolution up to the October Revolution of 1917, with the seizure of power 
by the Ukrainian Peoples Republic.33 This fi rst period was one of un-
precedented self-organisation and mobilisation in the confl ict with the 
Russian Provisional Government.34 The movement was a bloc of the mid-
dle class, peasantry and the Ukrainian section of the working class, cen-
tred in the Ukrainian Central Rada. There was a rich diversity of self-
organisation, illustrated in the Ukrainian Peasant Union, Utsentroprof the 
all-Ukrainian trade unions, councils of workers’ deputies, soldiers’ coun-
cils, factory committees, the Central Rada drew delegates from many of 
these and other bodies which appeared in the localities. Vynnychenko, 
fi rst president of the General Secretariat, the autonomous government, 
considered that the revolution seemed to be following a course which “cor-
responded to the entire nation’s character”
31 D.Doroshenko, Z Istorii Ukrainskoi Politychnoi Dumky Za Chasiv Svitovoi Viini, 
Praha, 1936, p., 37
32 The USDRP grew signifi cantly in 1917, in early May the USDRP claimed it was 
‘transforming itself into a mass workers’ organisation’, by the end of 1917 it claimed 
40,000 members. Robitnycha Hazeta, May 6, 1917, cited in Marko Bojcun, The 
Working Class and the National Question in Ukraine, 1880–1920, (Graduate Pro-
gram in Political Science, York University, Toronto, 1985, p279. 
33 It is worth recording that the USDRP played a pivotal role in the February Revo-
lution in Petrograd, 
34 Richtysky, Memorandum Ukrainskoi Kumunistichnoi Partii, p. 45-66,
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The Central Rada really consisted of councils of peasants’, soldiers’ and work-
ers’ deputies, who were elected at the respective congresses and sent to the Cen-
tral Rada. And the General Secretariat seemed to have been consisting only 
of socialists. And the leading parties, Social Democrats and Social-Revolution-
ists, seemed to have been standing fi rmly on the basis of social revolution.35
According to Andriy Richytsky, future leader of the Nezalezhnyky, the 
“Ukrainian Social Democracy gained a large infl uence among the Uk-
rai nian working masses and attracted into its ranks layers of workers who 
were tied to the spontaneous national and social movement of the popu-
lar masses.”36 During the “struggle with Russian imperialism, it held to 
a revolutionary national and class position” considered by” Ukrainian 
so cial-democrats their ‘Bolshevism’ period, although this ‘Bolshevism’ 
was upheld by the national struggle more than by the class struggle.”37 
This leading role contained a duality, on the one hand the ‘Bolshe-
vism’ Richytsky describes and on the other according to Vynnychenko “all 
subsequent errors, was imposed on the social democratic movement.”38 
Underlying these errors were fundamental differences over conceptions 
of the revolution and requisite strategy. On the burning questions, the 
war, agrarian revolution and workers self-management the leaders of 
the Central Rada prevaricated and at key moments lagged behind the 
pace of the movement from below, even on the national question with 
which it was preoccupied.39 Relations strained within the Central Rada, 
35 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, Vol. I:. p. 102. 
36 in some areas such as the Kryvyi Rih region, for example, it had the support of 
the majority of the proletariat. 
37 Richtysky, Memorandum Ukrainskoi Kumunistichnoi Partii, p. 45-66,
38 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzheniia natsii, Vol. I, p. 251-252.
39 Porsh complained that: ‘At fi rst the Central Rada was a bloc of parties united around 
the slogan of autonomy and federation. When our party entered the Rada, it re-
placed its class orientation with a national one. Some of our comrades said quite 
plainly that until we achieve the goal of unity there can be no class struggle in the 
Central Rada….As far as I am concerned, Ukrainian social democrats had no right 
compromising on class interests in deference to general, national ones’ , Robitny-
cha Hazeta 4th October 1917. According to Vynnychenko this was not simply due 
to their sociology, or opportunism but that they acted as ‘democrats, republicans 
and national revolutionists rather than socialists.’ Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia 
natsii, Vol.2, p. 89-90.
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between its leading circles drawn largely from the intelligentsia and the 
middle class, and the rank and fi le of the movement.40 
The prevailing opinion was that the recognition of Ukrainian auton-
omy was a precondition of progress, the April conference of the USDRP 
had seen it “as the very fi rst and urgent present objective of the Ukrain-
ian proletariat and the entire country.”41 This perspective corresponded 
with the orthodox Marxist dualist view that whilst a social revolution could 
be achieved in the West, only after the Russian Empire had passed into 
the historical phase of advanced capitalism and parliamentary democ-
racy would the requisite conditions become available for a social revolu-
tion. In his self critical history, Rebirth of a Nation Vynnychenko wrote 
“We, the Ukrainian Social Democrats, have emasculated the Marxism”.42 
These opinions were strongly challenged, on the one hand by the 
movement from below and on the other hand from above by the antago-
nism of the liberal and conservative wings of Russia. Even before Lenin’s 
April Theses, voices were being raised within the USDRP that the revolu-
tion needed to move beyond such fi xed the parameters to a social revo-
lution. This can be traced from March, when Nashe Zhyttya, reminded 
readers: “We are not just democrats; we are social-democrats, socialists., 
…the Great Socialist Society. That is our fi nal aim. The Constituent 
Assembly, the democratic republic are but means, stages to this end. 
We must not stand still.43 Culminating in the success of the left of the 
40 Raya Dunayevskaya identifi ed a similar problem in the anti-colonial revolutions 
after 1945: ‘The greatest obstacle to the further development of these national li-
be ration movements comes from the intellectual bureaucracy which has emerged 
to ‘lead’ them. In the same manner the greatest obstacle in the way of the work-
ing class overcoming capitalism comes from the Labor bureaucracy that leads it.’ 
Dunayevskaya, Nationalism, Communism, Marxist Humanism and the Afro-Asian 
Revolutions, Cambridge, 1961, p. 15.
41 Robitnycha Hazeta 7, April 1917. 
42 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, Vol 2:91 
43 Nashe Zhyttya [Our Life], 24 March 1917. That Ukrainian Social-Democrats were 
outlining this perspective in late March is of historical importance, very few pro-
jected these ideas until the return of Lenin with his April theses. When he pre-
sented it he was virtually isolated within the RSDRP(b). Ironically amongst the 
fi rst people he took his opinions to were the soldiers of the USDRP infl uenced 
Izmailovsky Regiment on 10th April.
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USDRP at the Fourth Congress of the USDRP in September, whose the-
ses, declared: 
The present Russian revolution, bringing in its wake a transformation in so-
cio-economic relations unheard of in the history of all previous revolutions, 
fi nding a broad echo in the great worker masses of Western Europe, awaken-
ing in them an impulse to abandon the path of capitalism, to make a social 
revolution and, at the same time, to stop the imperialist war, which may 
bring about an uprising of the proletariat in Western Europe – this revolu-
tion is a prologue to and beginning of the universal socialist revolution.44
The Central Rada was criticised for “inclining at every turn toward petty 
bourgeois nationalism”, demanding instead it’s General Secretariat “must 
be grounded in the organized revolutionary democracy of Uk raine and 
do its will instead”.45
The October Revolution brought these contradictions to a head, serv-
ing as a stimulus in the national sphere and sharply focusing the ques-
tion of the nature of the revolution. When the Central Rada seized power 
in November and declared the Ukrainian People’s Repub lic (UNR), it 
offered the possibility for a new beginning. This coincided with a ground-
swell of support for the conception of a republic based on the organs of 
pop ular self-government.46 The period of November and December 
brought to the fore what was the salient feature of the revolution in Uk-
raine, the division between the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian section of 
44 saw a combination of the new activists and traditional leaders, Neronovych, Rich-
ytsky, Tkachenko and Porsh, the main theses Robitnycha Hazeta, 1, 5 and 7 Oc-
tober 1917. 
45 Robitnycha Hazeta, 1, 5 and 7 October 1917, 
46 On August 20 1917, at a conference of Factory Committees in Kyiv the delegates 
voted 161 to 35 for the Bolshevik resolution. Trotsky, History of the Russian Rev-
olution , p. 267. On 8 September, a Katerynoslav area conference of the USDRP 
agreed it was necessary to strengthen the ‘achievements of the revolution for the 
Ukrainian workers’ and warned the USDRP faction in the Central Rada it ‘must ad-
here to consistent social-democratic tactics’ Similarly a general assembly of the Kyiv 
USDRP called for a ‘socialist General Secretariat’ and a break with coalitions, work-
ers control and an immediate peace . Robitnycha Hazeta, 21 September, 1917, 
INDEPENDENTIST UKRAINIAN MARXIST AND SOVIET HUNGARY • 181
the working class, the estrangement of the peasantry from the urban 
workers and the separation of the social and national dimensions.47 
These cleavages on the social and national questions found their res-
olution encapsulated in the idea of an independent Ukraine based upon 
the organs of workers’ and peasants’ self-government. A possible rap-
prochement between these divergent elements arose from two trends, the 
fi rst the growth in support in the USDRP and the Ukrainian Party of 
Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) for the revolutionary socialist regener-
ation of the Central Rada.48 The second trend was the surge of support 
in the soviets recognizing the Central Rada and seeking its re-election to 
widen its constituency.49 This demonstrated a radical evolution in work-
ing class opinions on the Ukrainian national question, splitting opinion 
in the Bolsheviks in the USDRP.50 
47 These problems of the revolution were highlighted in the writings of the Ukrai-
nian Bolsheviks Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhray in Do khvyli, Saratov,1919. 
There is also an English translation, The Current Situation in the Ukraine, Mich-
igan, 1970 . This became a key text of the pro-autonomy/independence currents 
of Ukrainian communism during the revolutionary years. 
48 The Third Congress of the UPSR stated that: ‘the national side of the revolution 
begins to threaten the further successful development of the socio-economic class 
struggle’ warning the Central Rada could lose the support of the peasants and 
workers in Ukraine which will also threaten the national gains of the revolution, 
Khrystiuk, Pavlo Zamitky i materiialy do istoriï ukraïns’koï revoliutsiï 1917–1920, 
(Prague in 1921), New York 1969.
49 In seven out of the ten of Ukraine’s largest cities the councils of workers’ and sol-
diers’ deputies supported the Central Rada as the legitimate governing organ. 
Evidence suggests the majority of the approximate 320 urban councils were ready 
to build an independent Ukraine, evidencing a clear evolution in working class opi-
nions on the national questionThis support for re-election was particularly strong 
in towns in the northern gubernyas and in Kyiv, Kremenchuk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, 
Kherson, Katerynsoslav, Odessa and Mykolaiv soviets. See: Yury. M. Hamretsky, 
Stavlennya Rad Robitnychykh I Soldatskykh Deputativ Ukrainy I Period Dvovlad-
dya do Pytan Natsionalo-Vyszvolenoho Rukh, Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, Ky-
iv, no.7 (1966).
50 The Kyiv Bolshevik Yevgenia Bosh records that the Third Universal was welcomed 
by ‘a signifi cant number of soviets in Ukraine’. Bojcun, Working Class and the Na-
tional Question, p. 306. Similarly Shakhray, a Poltava Bolshevik, records the ‘Proc-
lamation of the Ukrainian Republic was met with huge demonstrations all over 
Ukraine. A signifi cant part of the Soviets also welcomed it.’ Skorovstanskii, Revo-
liutsiia na Ukraini, p. 74. 
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That such a rapprochement was a viable possibility was illustrated by 
the various united revolutionary committees formed to defeat the Provi-
sional Government.51 But the forces that could bring this about did not 
combine and moved unevenly, the rapprochement necessary for its re-
alization was retarded. The Bolsheviks, who had no territorial organisa-
tion in Ukraine, were not unifi ed around such a perspective from within 
the UNR.52 The approach of their leadership in Russia was tactless, tak-
ing no account of the Ukrainian peculiarities and attempting to super-
impose the Russian model.53 The result compounded the divisions, hin-
dering those wishing to give the emerging social transformation a Uk-
rai nian character and form. 
The All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants Dep-
uties on 16 December 1917 proved to be a strategic catastrophe. The ur-
ban soviets were denied a proportional representation, the decisions of 
the USDRP to seek an alliance with the Bolsheviks to establish a work-
ers’ and peasants’ government, was overturned in a bureaucratic manoeu-
vre.54 The whole event was ignited by the surprise ultimatum of the Rus-
sian Council of People’s Commissars threatening war on the UNR.55 In 
51 This took organizational form in a ‘National Committee for the defence of the 
revolution’ created by the Central Rada, composed of representatives of all revo-
lutionary organizations in Kyiv and socialist parties in Ukraine, including repre-
sentatives of the Councils of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Ka-
terynoslav and OdessaRobitnycha Hazeta, 27 October 1917.
52 In their campaign for the re-election of the Rada through a congress of soviets, 
the Bolsheviks did not seek unity with like minded Ukrainian socialists, nor se-
cure support from the soviets which had already backed such a congress. Instead 
it was called by the RSDRP Kyiv Committee. See, Thomas M Prymak,, ‘The First 
All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets and its Antecedents’, Journal of Ukrainian Stu-
dies, No.6, Spring 1979.
53 An exception to this was the Poltava Committee of the RSDRP (Bolsheviks) who 
were engaged in negotiations with the USDRP and sought a revolutionary social-
ist regroupment in Ukraine. 
54 The USDRP pre-meeting before the Congress had decided in favour of seeking 
agreement with the Bolsheviks. Porsh, the UNR Secretary of Labour, was actively 
engaged in negotiations with the Bolsheviks.
55 An appeal to the Ukrainians on 8 December 1917 by the leading organs of soviet 
power in Russia , including the Central Executive Committee, demanded the ‘im-
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an atmosphere of recriminations the Congress endorsed the Central Ra-
da, but it was a pyrrhic victory, and an opportunity lost.56 
The internal fragmentation produced two rival bodies claiming to be 
the government of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic. The General Secre-
tariat of the Central Rada in Kyiv, which the USDRP withdrew from after 
the Fourth Universal, headed by the right wing of the UPSR, elected by 
‘Ukrainian congresses of peasants, workers and soldiers’. 57 Challenged 
by the Kharkiv based Peoples Secretariat of the ‘Central Executive Com-
mittee of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’, 
which included a split from the USDRP, the small U.S.-D (Left). It would 
be an error to view it as founded solely to give the Russian war the ap-
pearance of an internal confl ict. Vasyl Shakhrai a former USDRP organ-
iser and Bolshevik Minister, was insistent on the need for Ukrainian in-
dependence pointing out they waged war in order to revolutionize the 
government of the UNR.58 
mediate re-election of the Rada’ with the proviso: ‘Let the Ukrainians predomi-
nate in these soviets’. However when the Council of Peoples Commissars declared 
a war on the Central Rada behind the back of the CEC it did not receive unani-
mous or uncritical endorsement for its action. The Debate on Soviet Power, Min-
utes of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, Ed, John Keep, 
Oxford, 1979, p195-223.
56 Those delegates disaffected with the events in Kyiv walked out and made their 
way to the rival Congress of Soviets of the Donbas, Kryvyi Rih area being held in 
Kharkiv on 9 December 1917. Subsequent Soviet historiography would recog-
nize this event as the First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets. Though mainly con-
sisting of RSDRP(b) and Russian Left-SRs; it also included UPSR and USDRP 
delegates. A split took place in the USDRP, a tendency known as the USDRP(Left), 
headed by Medvedev and Neronovych. See: Butsenko, Afanasiy, ‘o raskole USDRP 
1917–18’, Letopis Revolutsii, no.4, Kharkiv, 1923, p. 121-122. 
57 The USDRP was indignant and predicted the worse of the right-wing UPSR, Ro-
bitnycha Hazeta wrote: And the revolutionary situation is marked now by a tran-
sition to the stage of anarchy, after which it will pass to reaction and entirely other 
elements that are far from the proletariat will stand at the helm of the state. At 
this moment our party cannot be responsible for the devious policy of the SRs.
Robitnycha Hazeta, 16 January, 1918. 
58 It is worth noting Shakhrai was an extreme critic of the Bolsheviks: “When open, 
armed struggle with the Central Rada began, Bolsheviks from all parts of Uk-
raine... were of one mind in proposing that a Soviet centre should be established 
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The hostilities, which lasted from December 1917 to early February 
1918, was a marked by paradox, the war-weary and revolutionised sol-
diers were not prepared to fi ght. The Central Rada ran into trouble, it 
policies had sown disillusionment amongst its base it struggled to mus-
ter forces.59 The Soviet forces were also incredibly small; Antonov often 
had to rely on “revolutionary detachments,” who concentrated on organ-
ising local risings.60 Nevertheless, in January 1918 Soviet troops, includ-
ing detachments from the north, quickly took Kyiv on 26 January 1918. 
Despite their efforts to make the war one of classes, to many it appeared 
as a national confl ict, paralysing much of the Ukrainian left. The expe-
rience of the short-lived Peoples Secretariat revealed it was not so much 
the puppet, as largely ignored by Soviet Russia’s troops.61 The involve-
in Ukraine as a counterweight to the Central Rada, and not one responsible mem-
ber of this party ventured to protest against the promulgation and creation of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic. On the contrary, in complete agreement with the 
programmatic demand of the right of every nation to self-determination, they 
openly or at least tacitly stood on its [the Republic’s] ground. The will of the Uk-
rai nian nation emerged, the Ukrainian people separated into a Republic in fed-
erative union with other parts of Russia. Well and good! We in this Republic will 
wage a war not against the Ukrainian People’s Republic, not against the Ukrainian 
people, not in order to strangle it. No! This will be a struggle for power within the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic – this will be a class struggle. ...” Vasyl Shakhrai [V. 
Skorovstansky], Revoliutsiia na Ukraine, 2nd ed. (Saratov 1918), 110-11. 
59 Holubnychy writes: ‘This reminds one of Lypynsky’s comments that the Ukrain-
ian socialist parties ‘gave away’ the land ‘in order to be politically popular’. Un-
fortunately, they did not give away enough and therefore were not suffi ciently pop-
ular. And this is why they failed, while Lenin succeeded ‘. Holubnychy, Selected 
Writings, p. 46-47. 
60 Yaroslav Bilinsky,, ‘The Communist Take-over of the Ukraine’, The Ukraine, 1917–
1921: A Study in Revolution, ed. Taras Hunczak, Cambridge, 1977, p. 110-11.
61 There was a retreat from the Kharkviv Congress of Soviets’ decisions with an array 
of splinter Soviet republics. Real power was revealed not to be the soviet govern-
ment but the military forces of Soviet Russia. Shakhray, a minister, complained: 
‘What kind of Ukrainian government is this when its members do not know and 
do not want to know the Ukrainian language? They have no infl uence in Ukrain-
ian society. No-one has even heard their names before. What kind of ‘Ukrainian 
Minister of the Army’ am I when all of the Ukrainised divisions in Kharkiv will 
not obey me and defend Soviet power and I am compelled to disarm them? The 
only military support we have in our struggle against the Central Rada is the army 
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ment of Soviet Russia and the Central Powers deepened the malaise; 
through the substitution of internal elements by external forces, the rev-
olution consumed itself. Lured by the appeal of the Germans the Cen-
tral Rada entered a union with the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk on 9 
February (27 January) 1918. The Germans then deposed both Ukrai-
nian Peoples Republics; fi rst the soviet, then like the proverbial horse of 
Troy, they turned on their hosts and on 29 April 1918 dispersed the Cen-
tral Rada as unreliable ‘left opportunists’.62 
The Nezalezhnyky: Revival and Retrogression 
in the Ukrainian Peoples Republic
The conservative coup d’état of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873–1945), 
‘only completed and crystallised in a precise form that which existed dur-
ing the time of the Central Rada’, on its return to Kyiv its revolutionary 
essence was dissipated.63 The new ‘Ukrainian State’ proved to be a retro-
gressive regime of comprador capitalists and landlords ‘aimed at the de-
struction of the revolutionary gains’ in the social, then national spheres.64 
This provoked militant resistance by the labour movement, but the most 
intense and violent opposition was peasant resistance to food requisition-
ing and restoration of land to the landowners. The Hetmanate proved 
to be a defi ning moment, sharpening the process of differentiation in 
the Ukrainian Revolution.
The outbreak of the revolution in Germany and Austro-Hungary and 
its own realignment towards a unifi ed Russian state, sealed the fate Sko-
ropadsky. The primary organizational initiative to overthrow the Het-
Antonov brought into Ukraine from Russia, an army moreover that looks at eve-
rything Ukrainian as hostile and counterrevolutionary.’ Cited in Bojcun, Working 
Class and the National Question, ibid, p. 327.
62 On 9 March 1918 Colonel von Stolzenberg told his High Command: ‘It is very 
doubtful whether this government, composed as it is exclusively of left opportun-
ists, will be able to establish a fi rm authority’, Oleh Fedyshyn, Germany’s Drive to 
the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918, New Brunswick, 1971 p. 96.
63 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennnia Natsii, Vol.III p. 24.
64 Ivan Maistrenko, Borotbism a Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism, 
New York 1953, republished, by Ibidem-Verlaag, Hannover, 2007.Borotbism, p72.
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manate and reconstitute the Ukrainian Peoples Republic came from a 
coalition headed by the Directory of the UNR.65 
The period Hetmanate had effectively cut Ukraine off from events oc-
curring in the rest of the former Russian Empire. It was sheltered from 
the excesses of “war communism” the brutality of the occupying armies 
discredited both the Central Rada, and its successor Ukrainian State as 
representations of the national idea in the eyes of many workers and es-
pecially peasants. In contrast the idea of the direct democracy of the so-
viets was preserved amongst the masses. Another often overlooked change 
was the major shift in working class opinion on the national question. 
This was confi rmed by the Second All-Ukrainian Workers Congress 
on 13 May 1918, despite a non-Ukrainian majority it agreed to a united 
struggle with the peasantry for an independent Ukrainian Peoples Re-
public, sentiments were further expressed at the All-Ukrainian Confer-
ence of Trade Unions, again largely non-Ukrainian in composition.66 
The Directory did not make an effort to involve the working class move-
ment, nevertheless it mobilised of its own volition, with city-wide strikes in 
Kharkiv, Kyiv and the Donbas forcing the All-Ukrainian Central Coun-
cil of Trade Unions to call a general strike on 20 November.67 
The uprising having restored the UNR and in so doing posed the 
question it faced in 1917, what happens after? With the hoped for socialist 
resurgence underway internationally the revolutionary left of the USDRP 
organised itself more effectively into a distinct faction, the Organising 
Committee of the USDRP Nezalezhnyky, established a in Kyiv in Early 
December 1918.68
65 The Directory members were, Vynnychenko, as Chairman, Petliura, F. Shevets of 
the Peasant Union, P. Andriievsky, Independent Socialists, and A.Makarenko rep-
resenting the rail workers trade union.
66 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, III.Bojcun, Working Class and the National Ques-
tion, p. 373.
67 Bojcun Working Class and the National Question, p. 385.
68 The most prominent members of the Nezalezhnyky included Mykhaylo Tka chen-
ko, veteran leader of the RUP and USDRP and former Minister of Internal Af-
fairs in the UNR, Andriy Richytsky had been one of the editors of Robitnycha 
Hazeta, he took part in the Congress of Socialist International in Stockholm in 
the summer of 1917, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, an old member of the USDRP and 
the Head of Council of Ministers in the UNR, Mykhaylo Avdiyenko, began as a 
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The ‘November Ukrainian Revolution’ was conducted “exclusively by 
the indigenous national-revolutionary forces of the Ukrainian people” 
and from the start it was clear the subjective forces were radically to the 
left of the Directory. The ‘Sovietophile’ majority of the UPSR, the Borot-
bisty already declared their opposition to the Directory and large sec-
tions of the army, such as the Dniprovska Division commanded by ota-
man Zeleny supported soviet power. At the State Conference convened 
by the Directory in Vynnytsia on 12–14 December, the Nezalezhnyky rep-
resented by Mykhaylo Avdiyenko argued it was necessary:
1: to recognize that a profoundly socio-economic, as well as political, revolu-
tion is taking place in Ukraine; 2. to recognize that its engine is the prole-
tariat and the toiling peasantry, and 3. in accordance with this, to declare 
the principle of the dictatorship of the toiling masses in the form of councils 
of workers’ and peasants’ deputies.69
This stance brought them into direct opposition with the Directory, who 
viewed them with suspicion.70 The Nezalezhnyky also differentiated them-
selves from the Bolsheviks now reorganised as the Communist Party (Bol-
sheviks) of Ukraine (KP(b)U), had not been formed through a process 
of unifi cation of the vernacular revolutionary left but was a subordinate 
of the Russian Communist Party, RKP(B). The disagreement of the Ne-
za lezhnyky was not solely on the question of Ukrainian independence 
but the role of the soviets and the character of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat: 
It is a party that aims not for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the revo-
lutionary peasantry, but for the dictatorship of a section of the proletariat 
and of its own party. It is, therefore, profoundly violent and it will replace 
soldier member of the strong Petrograd USDRP committee, Antin Drahomyret-
sky an old Kyiv USDRP activist, Yurko Mazurenko, as wartime offi cer, who blocked 
the passage to Petrograd of Kornilov 
69 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, Vol.IV, Chater III p. 52 
70 When the Dniprovska Division, entered Kyiv it on the defeat of Skoropadsky it 
was under red banners and slogans of ‘All power to the Soviets!’ and ‘All land to 
the peasants’. Fearing they would make an attempt to take power, Petlyura trans-
ferred them from the city. K.B.Petrichenko, Malovidomi Fakty z Zhyttya ta Diyal-
nosti Danylo Ilkovicha Terpylo (Otoman Zeleny), Institute of Ukrainian studies 
Kyiv, December 2006, [Unpublished].
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proletarian dictatorial violence against the bourgeois order with the violence 
of a small group.71
It had proven itself with regard to the principle of self-determination “a 
hypocritical party which continually violates its own principles” and in 
view of this “cannot be trusted until it is transformed organisationally and 
merges with the interests of the Ukrainian toiling people.”
With the revival of the UNR was accompanied by an extreme retro-
gressionist trend, the conservative elements of the Hetmanate, in par-
ticular the military circles – the otamanschyna, were its inherent partner, 
who were engaged in pogroms and indiscriminate repression of the la-
bour and peasant movement.72 The middle class and moderate elements 
though favouring a parliamentary democracy, found themselves politi-
cal prisoners of this element on whom they were reliant.73 
The UN was further riven by a division on its international position; 
it was increasingly clear that if the UNR was to survive it required an 
ally. Despite the renewed hostilities Vynnychenko, and the Nezalezhny-
ky Volodymyr Chekhivsky, Head of Council of Ministers, saw their natu-
ral ally as Soviet Russia; the alternative pole was the Entente as advocat-
ed by Petlyura. The Entente’s main concern was the Russian Volunteer 
Army (VA), a force fi ghting to restore the Empire.74 On 18 December 1918, 
71 Ukrainian People’s Socialist Republic December 1918, Robitnycha Hazeta, no. 430, 
7 January 1919.
72 An illustration was Colonel Bolbochan, the former Hetmanate commander of the 
Zaporozhian Division, who was appointed the Directory’s commander in chief in 
Left-Bank Ukraine. Bolbochan instituted a reign of terror against the resurgence 
of the agrarian revolution and the workers councils Mark Baker, Peasants, Power 
and Revolution in the Village:  A Social History of Kharkiv Province p. 167-168.
73 Assessing what had arisen from the Ukrainian National Union the Nezalezhnyky, 
‘Andr. Mykh’ wrote :Whatever was alive and popular in it has passed to the mass-
es where it works. But remnants of the nationalist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia 
cling to the blue and yellow banner, arrange buffoonery, meetings to the sound 
of church bells, prayer services and other attributes of national sentimentalism, 
which only serve to discredit the popular movement and its leaders. Our task and 
the task of the Directory at the present moment is to break completely with rem-
nants of the national front. Robitnycha Hazeta 25, December 1918. 
74 See: Anna Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine The Nationality Policy of the 
Volunteer Army During the Civil War, Edmonton 1995. 
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French and VA troops took Odessa proclaiming a ‘South Russian’ gov-
ernment. To the frustration of Ukrainian forces the Directory adopted 
restraint. In this situation the overall trend of the Nezalezhnyky was to-
wards a breach with the Directory. 
Things came to a head at the Sixth Congress of the USDRP on 10th-
12 January 1919.75 The Congress became a debate on soviet power and 
the dictatorship of the proletariat with Richytsky moving the Nezalezh-
nyky theses. The task of the proletariat of Ukraine was ‘the transforma-
tion of the sovereign and independent Ukrainian People’s Republic into 
the sovereign and independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic’.76 Power 
would be organized on the ‘principle of the dictatorship of the urban and 
rural proletariat and the poorer toiling peasantry, organized in worker-
peasant councils.’77 The government was to be reorganized on the basis of 
representation from revolutionary Ukrainian parties which stand for:
a) the independence of the national Ukrainian Socialist Republic, and b) the 
power of the worker-peasant councils. This government is transitional until 
the organization of the government by the All-Ukrainian Congress of Work-
er-Peasant Councils.78
On the question of international politics their resolution defended the ‘in-
dependence of Ukraine demanding from the government:
a) a rapprochement with the Russian Soviet Republic, on the basis of 
mutual recognition of the sovereignty of both socialist republics, com-
plete and mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of the neighbour-
ing republic, the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the terri-
tory of Ukraine (including the Crimea), their non-interference in the 
in ternal affairs of Ukraine and, in the case of refusal, an active defence 
of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic against imperialist attack.79
A majority of the Central Committee spoke in favour, the opposition was 
a combination of the centrists and the right-wing ‘Katerynoslav group’ 
75 See: Chervony Prapor, 22 January 1919
76 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
77 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
78 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
79 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
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of Issak Mazepa, Panas Fadenko and Ivan Romanchenko, joined surpris-
ingly by Porsh.80 The majority supporting a socialist revolution in the 
west, but considered the conditions lacking in Ukraine. It is debatable 
how representative the conference was in a situation where members of 
the Central Committee couldn’t sleep in their own beds for fear of ar-
rest.81 The divisions in the USDRP already apparent beforehand, now 
became an accomplished fact. After their resolution was defeated, the Ne-
zalezhnyky walked out of the USDRP. 
The Nezalezhnyky trajectory was now to split; they launched Chervony 
Prapor on the 22 January, coinciding with the unity of the UNR and the 
West Ukrainian Peoples Republic.82 It included a Declaration written by 
Tkachenko and Richytsky stating it was now time to move from a ‘pas-
sive waiting state to an active and creative struggle for the reconstruc-
tion of the whole socio-political and economic order of Ukraine.’ At the 
Sixth Congress the question was sharply posed ‘either the old or the new 
– and the offi cial party stood between them.83 They rejected the claim 
of the ‘offi cial party’ to be the greater democrats asserting their democ-
racy ‘would inevitably turned into the dictatorship of the middle classes’ 
and in ‘a parliamentary order the popular masses will be excluded from 
creative action’. In contrast the socialist revolution would create ‘a gov-
ernment based on the active participation of the toiling masses.’84 
Responding to the fear of the dominance of the ‘non-Ukrainian ur-
ban element’ they pointed out that the ‘proletariat was not entirely for-
80 The discussions that Porsh held with Mazepa on their own do not explain such a 
volte face by Porsh. One can only surmise that the experience of the Bolshevik 
rule in Ukraine had seriously disillusioned Porsh, as it had others. It was his last 
speech to a USDRP audience in Ukraine after which he was dispatched as UNR 
ambassador to Germany. In January 1921 he began to adopt a more sovietophile 
politics, he made a speech at a student meeting calling on the émigrés to recog-
nise the Soviet Ukrainian government and return to the Ukraine. Porsh applied 
return to the Ukraine himself in 1922 and in January 1923 the Ukrainian Polit-
buro decided to allow him to return though he never took up the offer. He started 
to drift away from political activity and tragic death in Germany in 1944. 
81 Vynnychenko, Vidrozhenia Natsii, Vol.III, p. 242. 
82 Chervony Prapor, 22 January 1919
83 Chervony Prapor, 22 January 1919
84 Chervony Prapor, 22 January 1919
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eign’ and emphasised “the proletariat in Ukraine can and must come to 
power together with the revolutionary peasantry.”85 In the course of the 
revolution the non-Ukrainian workers would be drawn more and more 
into all forms of internal life in Ukraine and ‘rid themselves of the rem-
nants of old Russia and will join the Ukrainian people and proletariat.’ 
The debate of the Sixth Congress was repeated at All-Ukrainian La-
bour Congress which opened on 23 January 1919. The Congress was to 
perform; to legitimise the UNR in a forum of the popular movement.86 
The military circles mounted a campaign of harassment of the very forc-
es on which the republic was to be based, its elections were stifl ed.87 The 
Directory’s credibility had rapidly eroded, in the countryside peasant 
brigades were defecting en masse to the Borotbisty or Bolsheviks, the 
ar my of the UNR had declined from 100,000 to 21,000 by the third week 
of January.88 
The Nezalezhnyky participated forming a bloc with those parties sup-
portive of soviet power, the Borotbisty, the left Bundists and those Bol-
sheviks who attended despite their offi cial boycott. Zinovyev of the Ne-
zalezhnyky outlined their opposition in a declaration which he read at 
the Congress on the 26 January.89 Unsurprisingly it failed to convince 
85 Chervony Prapor, 22 January 1919
86 According to Mazepa the decision to call the All-congress ‘was an obvious conces-
sion to Bolshevik slogans. The landowners and fi nancial and business circles, which 
had supported the Hetmanate were excluded.’ Maistrenko, Borotbism, p. 100. 
87 At the time of elections to the Labour Congress, part of the Left Bank had already 
been taken by Soviet troops, and in part of it the peasants and workers were at war 
with the Directory’s army. Thus elections could not be held there. On the Right 
bank there was a wave of pogroms. In the south the French army and the Russian 
Volunteer Army had captured Odessa and were advancing. Whilst the National 
Rada of the Western Province of the UNR were invited to participate with full vot-
ing rights, in sharp contrast at the insistence of Petlyura, Konovalets and other 
otamans, the soldiers of the UNR were deprived of electoral rights to participate. 
88 Bojcun, The Working Class and the National Question, p. 398.
89 It stated that whilst recognising the Directory had played positive role ‘‘the ab-
sence of a clearly defi ned class character’ resulted in ‘the vacillating and indeci-
sive character of both its internal and external policy.’ The result was ‘war with 
Socialist Russia and the possibility of an alliance with the imperialist Entente”. 
The Nezalezhnyky demanded A ‘new coalition government is formed of pro-so-
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the congress, in response the pro-Soviet bloc completely abstained from 
the voting, made a declaration they did not recognised the competence of 
the congress and then walked out. The USDRP had called the congress 
with the desire to strengthen the authority of the Directory instead it nei-
ther failed to arrest its downward spiral nor alter its course of action. 
Pavlo Khrystiuk contends that the Nezalezhnyky stance bound them 
for a long time to the Directory in their effort to transform the UNR. 90 
In practice their approach of the Nezalezhnyky during December 1918–
January 1920 involved a combination of tactics of reform and revolution, 
where the popular movement possessed the strength to oust the Direc-
tory they supported such a course, whilst still seeking an overall socialist 
transformation from within the UNR. The Nezalezhnyky also attempt-
ing to utilise their posts within the UNR to broker a rapprochement with 
Soviet Russia, there was initially vacillation on the part of the Council of 
Peoples Commissars towards the Directory, it was possibly without Len-
in’s knowledge that the Red Army advanced into Ukraine in late Decem-
ber 1918.91 Under pressure from the left the Directory sent a special dip-
lomatic mission on 15 January 1920 to Moscow.92 Yurko Mazurenko a 
leading Nezalezhnyky took on the mission of conducting negotiations: 
I declared that I would go on the condition that decrees on the transfer of 
local power to the Soviets and a call for a congress of Soviets (and not a La-
bour Congress) to be published immediately, as well as on the condition that 
the communist party would be legalised. For this, of course, I was ostracised 
by the Directorate.93
Controversy surrounds the success of this mission which the left claims 
was sabotaged by Petlyura, their efforts resulting in the declaration of war 
viet parties” and a ‘Ukrainian Socialist Republic of Councils’Chervony Prapor, 6 
February 1919
90 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV, p. 13
91 Arthur E.Adams, The Bolsheviks In The Ukraine The Second Campaign, 1918–
1919, New Haven 1963, p. 82-85.
92 Chekhivsky telegramming that: ‘Our government, will transfer all power to the La-
bour Congress and is prepared to do anything to avoid spilling proletarian blood.’ 
Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
93 Yu.Mazurenko, Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
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on Soviet Russia on 16 January 1919.94 By this time Chekhivsky and 
Vynnychenko had resigned from the government over its Entente turn.’95 
Despite public denial that Avdiyenko was preparing an uprising, the 
Nezalezhnyky turned to the establishment of soviet power by force.96 At 
a congress of the in Hryhoriv the Dniprovska Division renamed itself the 
First Kyiv Soviet Division and elected Danylo Zeleny as otaman along with 
a Revolutionary Committee joined by the Nezalezhnyky.97 Their previ-
ous dual approach towards the Directory did place the USDRP Neza lezh-
nyky at a disadvantage in comparison to the Bolsheviks who were strong-
er in the cities and the Borotbisty in the countryside. They could act uni-
laterally but not decisively without allies, the Borotbisty had established 
a Central Revolutionary Committee, seeking to meet the Russian Bolshe-
viks with an existing soviet government.98 However, political differenc-
es between the Ukrainian Marxists and the Borotbistsy with their po-
pu list origins prevented a higher level of unity being achieved. 
94 An act complimented by Red Army commander Antonov also lobbying Moscow 
against an agreement stating there was ‘nobody in Ukraine with whom we should 
negotiate’. Stachiw, Ukraine and the European Turmoil Vol 2, New York, 1973, p 
258.
95 ‘After Mazurenko fi nally succeeded in thrusting upon the Directory his courier, its 
new head S. Petlyura, with curses sent him away without having accepted the re-
port of the head of the delegation, which was authorised to act also by the signa-
ture of the ‘Commander-in-Chief ’.’Vynnychenko Vidrozhennia Natsii, Vol. III p. 
279-280. 
96 Most successfully in Left-Bank Ukraine in Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Katerynoslav 
guberniya the Directory was overthrown. On the Right Bank attempted risings 
occurred in Volhynia, Zhytomyr and in the Obruch district where the Otamansh-
chyna responded with pogromsIn Vynnychenko’s estimation in the territory un-
der their control: ‘There was neither punishment, nor justice, nor trials, nor con-
trol over these criminals and enemies of the revolution and the national movement. 
The whole system of military authority was constructed and consciously based, by 
the chief otamany, on the principle that there would be no control.’ Vynnychenko, 
Vidrodzheniia Natsii Vol. III p. 188.
97 Petrichenko, Malovidomi Fakty z Zhyttya ta Diyalnosti Danylo Ilkovicha Terpylo 
(Otaman Zeleny)
  98 Maistrenko, Borotbism p. 118-119.
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Independent Republic of Soviets or ‘Commissar State’
The Ukrainian Bolshevik leader Yurii Lapchynsky emphasised that in 
1919 the “communist movement and Soviet power in Ukraine were built 
in a political situation, which was totally different to the fi rst period.”99 
The situation could not have been more favourable for a convergence be-
tween the Ukrainian and the Russian Revolutions, and reconciliation 
of the internal elements. The creation of a Ukrainian republic based on 
councils with a plurality of pro-soviet parties appeared a viable possibil-
ity. On 4 February 4 1919 the Directory of the UNR withdrew from Kyiv 
in the face of the advancing the Soviet forces, Chervony Prapor conclud-
ing ‘the Directory’s positive role was fi nished’.100
The Red Army entered Kyiv on 5 February unopposed, welcomed by 
an announcement of the Executive of the Kyiv Soviet of Workers Depu-
ties signed by the Nezalezhnyky, Bolsheviks and Borotbist deputies stat-
ing ‘the Directory has been driven from Kyiv and red Soviet battalions 
under the leadership of the Worker-Peasant Government of Ukraine are 
entering the city.’ 101 But the Nezalezhnyky had not abandoned their 
earlier criticism, greeting the new government in a leading article on 6 
February Chervony Prapor wrote: 
If the Directory stupidly repeated an outdated policy that has already been 
condemned by history, then the Russian Bolsheviks have come by the same 
outdated path... Under the slogan of the struggle for the power of the soviets 
arrives a government that calls itself Ukrainian, but which we do not and 
cannot describe as such.102
The KP (b) U by its own volition had established a ‘Provisional Worker-
Peasant Government of Ukraine’ in Moscow.103 It was formed externally 
  99 Chervonyy Prapor, Kharkiv, 11 July 1920
100 Chervony Prapor, 6, February 1919. 
101 The announcement was signed by the head of the committee Bubnov and the 
following members: P. Syrodenko, P. Dehtiarenko, M. Maior, V. Cherniavsky, H. 
Volkov, H. Myhailychenko, P. Liubchenko, I. Kachura, A. Chekhsis, I. Frenkel, and 
M. Avdiienko. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
102 Chervony Prapor, 6, February 1919.
103 Arthur E.Adams, The Bolsheviks In The Ukraine The Second Campaign, 1918–
1919, New Haven 1963, p. 25-64.
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outside of the revolutionary process; initially at its head was Georgii Pya-
takov who provided its theoretical scaffolding. Pyatakov part of the left-
Communist current, fl ushed with revolutionary romanticism they were 
a strong element in the KP (b) U and opposed national self-determina-
tion as a slogan invalidated by imperialism.104 By decision of Moscow, 
Pyatakov had been replaced as unelected head of the government by Chris-
tian Rakovsky, recently arrived from the Balkans.105 
But, despite their opposition to the Rakovsky’s government, the Ne-
zalezhnyky did not reject the possibility of cooperation. The same issue 
of Chervony Prapor carried a resolution of the Organizational Commit-
tee stating they were willing: 
To enter the government and to take full responsibility for it only if: 1. All 
offi cial organs of the supreme government – not only Ukrainian, but also 
Russian – recognize the independence and autonomy of the Ukrainian So-
cialist republic; 2. If a fi rm national and social course is taken in Ukraine, 
and Ukrainian is the only offi cial language.106
The views of the Rakovsky were already apparent before his arrival in Ky-
iv; he had declared himself a specialist on the Ukrainian question, hav-
ing spent a mere three months in Kyiv in 1918. In Izvestiia, he announced 
the following theses: the ethnic differences between Ukrainian and Rus-
sians are insignifi cant, the Ukrainian peasantry lacked national con-
sciousness. National consciousness has been submerged in social class con-
sciousness. The Ukrainian proletariat is purely Russian in origin.107 Ra-
kovsky concluded the Ukrainian national movement was an invention of 
the intelligentsia. These ideas combined with Pyatakov’s ‘left-Commu-
104 Pyatakov’s most well known work on the national question is The Proletariat and 
the ‘Right of Nations of self-determination’ in the Era of Finance Capital, written 
under the name of ‘P. Kievsky’ published in 1916 with Lenin’s reply A Caricature 
of Marxism and Imperialist Economism.
105 Key texts are, Christian Rakovsky, Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 
1923–30, ed. Gus Fagan, London 1980, Pierre Broué: Rakovsky, Cahiers Léon 
Trotsky, no.17-18. L’Institut Léon Trotsky, 1984. Neither of them actually engage 
critically with the policy of Rakovsky in Ukraine in 1919. 
106 Chervony Prapor, 6, February 1919. 
107 Mazlakh and Shakhray, On The Current Situation p. 1115-117.
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nists’ and the Russophile ‘Katerynoslavians’ in the KP(b)U laid fertile 
ground for confl ict. 
The state administration was constructed on administrators brought 
from Russia and largely from the local Russian petit-bourgeoisie who joi-
ned the KP(b)U to qualify for employment. Tkachenko writes that whilst 
the KP(b)U government was establishing itself: 
All sorts of Russian nationalist elements from the Black Hundreds to the rev-
olutionary intelligentsia in Ukraine were joining forces with the Bolsheviks 
to help reconstruct a ‘united and indivisible Russia’. ... Unreliable elements 
signed up with the Bolshevik party and contributed to enhancing the natio-
nalistic and even chauvinist coloration of the Bolshevik proletarian move-
ment... Even the Russian communist press was writing enthusiastically about 
the unifi cation of Russia and this milieu of ‘specialists’ as well as the nation-
alism of the Russian communists themselves deepened the split within the 
proletariat along national lines... promoting its in its midst a fi erce struggle 
out of which the reaction raised its head.108
The Nezalezhnyky viewed these developments with growing frustration, 
accusing the regime of failing to reverse a situation ‘which came about 
as a result of the age-old oppression of the Ukrainian people by Musco-
vite imperialism’.109 Instead ‘the kind of insane and disgraceful Russifi -
cation sweeping Ukraine right now has never been seen before even dur-
ing the Hetmanate rule in its last `federative’ phase’: 
Not one pamphlet in Ukrainian for the Ukrainian peasant, not one brochure, 
not one newspaper of the soviet government in Ukrainian! The Ukrainian 
language has been driven out from wherever it was. A whole series of orders 
on using the `generally understood language’ is a sign of the times. And to 
the modest demands of the Ukrainian citizen that at least his national and 
cultural rights, like those of the `fraternal’ people here in Ukraine, be safe-
guarded, there is but one reply: chauvinism and the spirit of the bourgeoisie 
and the counter-revolution.110
108 Tkachenko, Borotba Vienna, (April 1920).
109 Chervony Prapor, 14, February 1919
110 Chervony Prapor, 9, March 1919.
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When Rakovsky came to the Kyiv Soviet on of 13 February he never men-
tioned the national question at all. This provoked a string of criticism 
from Ukrainian and Jewish deputies who pointed to the mistakes of the 
fi rst Soviet Government and the need for the involvement of other par-
ties. Avdiyenko attacked this failure to address ‘the important national 
question in Ukraine and the question of the proletariat’s role in resolv-
ing the national question’:
In every country the struggle with the bourgeoisie is the affair of the prole-
tariat of that country. For the success of that struggle the proletariat of every 
country must be organized. Moreover comrade Rakovsky said nothing about 
what the provisional government must do in order to organize the Ukraini-
an proletariat and draw it into the revolutionary struggle.111 
Rakovsky’s defence poured oil on the fl ames; he ridiculed calls to intro-
duce the Ukrainian language in education and government as ‘linguistic 
music’ branding it a ‘reactionary and completely unnecessary mea sure’.112 
The Chervony Prapor wrote that that behind ‘their cosmopolitanism lies 
nothing other than a not very hidden Russifi cation’ in continuity with 
Tsarist practices: “If we are not afraid to use social force over the bour-
geoisie, then neither are we afraid of using the small social force over 
that same bourgeoisie and intelligentsia by forcing them to know the lan-
guage of the people at whose expense they are living.”113 The Chervony 
Prapor ran a string of articles on offi cial instructions for the use of the 
Russian language in the administration of the Soviet Republic; this even 
involved the reversal of practices introduced in the Hetmanate.114 
The rift that grew within Soviet Ukraine stemmed not only from dis-
satisfaction with policy on the national question but also despite the prom-
ise of the ‘rebirth of soviet power locally’, there was an overall absence of 
self-government. The republic was ruled through appointed revolution-
111 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
112 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
113 Chervony Prapor, 15, February 1919.
114 For example Chervony Prapor, 13, February 1919 reported A letter of the Com-
missar of the Chief Military Administration, stating ‘In Soviet Russia only the Rus-
sian language is written, and it is not permitted to spend the people’s money for 
translators. Please write in Russian.’ 
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ary committees, revkomy, and in the countryside, committees of poor peas-
ants, kombedy.115 Workers councils existed only in the large towns and 
then only in an advisory capacity; soviet power as such did not exist.116 
In April the Ukrainian trade union movement was purged, subordinat-
ed to the state and absorbed into All-Russian structures.117 Branded by 
Ukrainian Marxists as the ‘commissar state’ this dangerous alienation 
was compounded by the retarding of the agrarian revolution through 
excesses of grain requisitioning and the transplanting from Russia of an 
elitist land policy of the ‘commune’, formed not by the self-activity of the 
peasants but imposed from above. Whilst Soviet planners sought to cen-
tralise the Ukrainian economy with Russia, ‘in actuality the Ukraine was 
plundered randomly, like a vast treasure chest for food and fuel.’118
In late February Chervony Prapor pointed out that these policies were 
starting to produce centrifugal forces, most violently amongst the peas-
antry. It emphasised there is grain in Ukraine which must be given vol-
untarily to the ‘starving Russian worker and as much as he needs’, but 
instead the requisition squads ‘come and take not just grain, but every-
thing that they can take and carry off.’ Not only were these methods pro-
voking unrest but they questioned the sovereignty of Soviet Ukraine. It 
required proper transparent trade agreements, ‘this is possible only if 
Ukraine is sovereign not in words but in reality, only if the workers them-
selves are masters in their own socialist republic and not foreign pre ten-
ders.’119
Whilst still preserving problematic connections in some regions such 
as in Katerynoslav, in March 1919 the Nezalezhnyky abandoned their po-
sition as a faction and renamed themselves the Ukrainian Social Demo-
115 Adams, The Bolsheviks In The Ukraine The Second Campaign, p 125.
116 Workers councils existed only in the large towns, in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Ka-
terynoslav, Poltava, Chernihiv, and then only in an advisory capacity. 
117 There was major debates between Nezalezhnyky and supporters of ‘statisation’ 
in the congresses of the chemical workers union, trade and industrial offi ce work-
ers, the tobacco workers, the metal workers, printers, the miners union, sugar re-
fi nery workers and the All-Ukrainian Teachers Union. Bojcun, Working Class and 
the National Question, p .446-449.
118 Thomas, Remington, Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia, Ideology and In-
dustrial Organisation 1917–1921, Pittsburgh, 1984, p. 167 
119 Chervony Prapor, February 28, 1919
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cratic Workers Party Independentists. This was only a transitional name 
until their planned congress on 30 March, they had decided it was ‘nec-
essary to quickly devise a communist programme and organise a Ukrai-
nian Communist Party.’120 In this endeavour the Nezalezhnyky were en-
gaged in discussions with some Bolsheviks no doubt to the consterna-
tion of the KP(b)U leadership.
This decision also coincided with the founding of the Communist In-
ternational. At the founding congress held on March 2–6, 1919 in Mos-
cow, Mykola Skrypnyk representing the KP(b)U gave an upbeat report 
on Ukraine, welcoming the spit the USDRP saying that: ‘Although these 
Independent Socialists differ from the Communists on fundamentals, 
they are nevertheless working harmoniously with our party today and 
participate in the soviets’.121 Yet this was far from the approach being 
taken at the Third Congress of the KP(b)U then underway in Kharkiv. 
The Kyiv ‘left-Communists’ led by Pyatakov reasserted their infl uence 
securing the majority of votes and positions on the Central Committee. 
The congress endorsed the policy of War Communism and that Ukraine 
enters the RSFSR as an autonomous republic. More ominously by a nar-
row margin of 101 to 96 a resolution was carried against co-operation 
with other pro-soviet parties, stating ‘agreements with such parties as the 
Right SR’s, Independent Ukrainian Social Democrats and others are ad-
missible’.122 These parties were to be denied ‘any responsible posts in the 
soviets’ and excluded from the government of Ukraine, ‘which should 
consist solely of the representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine’.123 Ap-
proaches for fusion with the KP(b)U by the Borotbisty-Communists and 
left Bund were also rejected.124 
120 Yu.Mazurenko, Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
121 John Riddell Ed. Founding the Communist International, Proceedings and Doc-
uments of the First Congress, New York, 1987, p. 98.
122 KP(b)U Third Congress was held between March 1–6, 1919, Adams, The Bolshe-
viks In The Ukraine, p. 218-219.
123 Maistrenko, Borotbism, p. 124-125.
124 This fl ew in the face of earlier instructions of Lenin to Rakovsky that the non-
Bolsheviks parties be involved in the government Adams,The Bolsheviks In The 
Ukraine, p. 120.
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This decision came on the eve of the Third All-Ukrainian Congress 
of Workers’ Peasants’ and Red Army Deputies’ to which the government 
had previously assured it would ‘hand over power in the country’.125 The 
congress was held in Kyiv from 6-10 March, of the 1,719 delegates about 
80 percent were Bolsheviks, and out of the minority the Nezalezhnyky 
mustered forty-two deputies.126 Formal elections had been held only the 
parts of four provinces and the majority of delegates were from revkomy 
not soviets.127 
Far-reaching socialist policies were outlined in the resolutions of the 
congress, and by the new Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic.128 The problem was that the Constitution was not implemented; 
furthermore Ukraine remained, and was considered by the government, 
a regional unit of Russia.129 The Borotbisty were “elected” to the Central 
Executive Committee, which comprised 90 KP(b)U and 10 Borotbisty.130 
They were allowed into the government ‘only in order to show a bit of 
Ukrainian colour,’ declared the Nezalezhnyky, the ‘commissar state’.131 
Drahomyretsky wrote from Kyiv that ‘not withstanding the disillusion-
ment with the present regime, the masses continue to raise soviet slo-
gans’.132 Indicative of this was the subsequent Kyiv District Congress of 
the Councils of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies held on 24-25 March. 
The congress called for the inadequate representation of the peasantry 
in organs of power to be remedied, but went further stating that ‘Soviet 
power must not be undermined by a bureaucratic apparatus’ resolving 
125 Manifest Vremennogo Raboche Krestianskogo Pravitel’stva Ukrainy, December 
1, 1918, cited in Mazlakh and Shakhrai, On The Current Situation, p. 27.
126 Jujij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917–1923, Edmonton 1980, p. 419, 
127 Bojcun, The Working Class and the National Question p. 465.
128 Borys, Sovietization of Ukraine, p. 218
129 According to Balabanoff, fi rst Secretary of the Communist International and a 
friend of Rakovsky’s sent to assist him in Kyiv, ‘the Bolsheviks had set up an in-
dependent republic in the Ukraine. In actuality that section of it in which Soviet 
rule was established was completely dominated by the Moscow regime’. Angelica 
Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel, London 1938, p. 234.
130 Adams, Bolsheviks in Ukraine, p. 125.
131 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
132 cited in Bojcun, The Working Class and the National Question, p. 464, 
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to ensure that ‘the election of organs of power must be convened and 
held with the full consent of the electors, without any pressure from the 
administration.’ On the national question it declared the ‘Ukrainian So-
cialist Soviet Republic must be sovereign and not dependent on anyone, 
but in a strong alliance with other socialist republics’.133 
In the spring of 1919, the government engaged in a bitter struggle against 
the newly created USDRP Nezalezhnyky. They were ‘deluged on all sides 
with accusation of nationalist chauvinism, of being counter-revolution-
ary and petty-bourgeois.’134 How the KP(b)U defi ned these “counter-rev-
olutionary” politics of the Nezalezhnyky was outlined by Cheskis a mem-
ber of the Executive Committee of the Kyiv Soviet: 
The most diffi cult thing is this question with the independent Ukrainian so-
cial democrats, who have not yet given up their national demands and auton-
omist view of the political system of Ukraine. If, of course, the Nezalezhnyky 
renounce the last point of their programme and come closer to a true soviet 
platform, the participation in the government will certainly be possible.135
On the night of the 25th March, after the above Congress had fi nished 
Richytsky, Mazurenko and other Nezalezhnyky were arrested on the or-
ders of the Cheka and Chervony Prapor temporarily closed down.136 This 
had disastrous results, the planned party congress did not place or the 
new Ukrainian Communist Party launched. 137 After several days those 
arrested were released and Chervony Prapor reappeared, with an open 
letter from the editors demanding an end to the repression, in an article 
by Kachinivsky on the way ahead he summarised: “It is now two months 
since the soviet authorities occupied Kyiv, but we have yet to see real so-
133 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
134 ’The Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky do not recognize the government; the Ukrainian 
Nezalezhnyky incite the workers and peasants against the government; the Uk-
rai nian Nezalezhnyky agitate against helping starving Soviet Russia with grain 
from Ukraine; the Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky infl ame national hatred; the Ukrai-
nian Nezalezhnyky insist on drawing the rural proletariat into revolutionary con-
struction and oppose the proletariat,’ Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
135 Chervony Prapor, 9 February 1919.
136 Chervony Prapor, 3, April 1919
137 Yu.Mazurenko, Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
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viet power or the dictatorship of the proletariat. All we have is the dicta-
torship of the communist party.”138
The intervention of the Hungarian Soviet Republic 
The policies of the Rakovsky regime began to produce powerful centrif-
ugal forces; engulfed by worker and peasant unrest, the Ukrainian SSR 
started to fragment and disintegrate into internecine confl ict. This crisis 
saw two tendencies which have complicated historical analysis ever since: 
on the one hand the attempted revolutionary mobilization of society and 
on the other its antithesis – fragmentation and class decomposition.139 
The decomposition of industry became catastrophic with ‘shortages 
of electricity, food, materials, and skilled workers’.140 Indicative of this 
decomposition were pogroms, brigandage and otaman adventurers. No 
sides in the confl ict escaped being tainted by the effects of this vortex. 
This crisis became increasingly acute jus as the communist revolution 
in Europe unfolded, with proclamation of the Hungarian Republic of 
Councils on 21 March followed by the proclamation on 6 April of the Ba-
varian Soviet Republic. The Ukrainian question became integral to de-
ciding their fate; for it was from here that any direct connection could 
be made between the soviet republics.141 However from the start its achieve-
 ment was impeded by the events in Ukraine, 
Historian Rudolf L.Tokés asserts that “Béla Kun was lacking in detai-
led information on the Ukrainian situation”, and as such he did not ap-
138 Chervony Prapor, 3, April 1919
139 The working class had reached the point of exhaustion by the third year of the 
revolution in Ukraine. Industrial production plummeted to between 15-20 per-
cent of its pre-war level by 1920. Many unemployed workers volunteered or were 
drafted into the armies, 50,000 Donbas workers were in the Red Army by Octo-
ber 1918, 40,000 were conscripted in May 1919. Many in local areas joined their 
local militia or irregulars. In the urban areas their was food shortages and a ty-
phus epidemic n 1919–20. For many it was better to escape to the countryside. 
140 Vladimir, Brovkin, ‘Workers Unrest and Bolshevik Responses in 1919’, Slavic Re-
view, Vol.49, No.3, 1990, p. 353.
141 This had been long recognised, Karl Radek had said in 20 October 1918 at the 
KP(b)U congress that the “our road to aid the workers of the Central Powers lies 
precisely over Ukraine, over Romania, Over Eastern Galicia and over Hungary”. 
Sovietization of Ukraine, p. 205.
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preciate the selfi shness of Russian Bolshevik polices as regards Soviet 
Hun gary.142 L.Tokés saw this in terms of their failure to deploy Hungar-
ian units of the Red Army in a drive towards Hungary, and putting their 
own survival before world revolution. In fact the opposite is the case; the 
government in Budapest had a very good understanding of the Ukrain-
ian situation and sought to assist in bringing about a change in a man-
ner which stood in stark contrast to the practices of the Russian Com-
munists. 
A Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission had been established in Hungary since 
February 1919, headed by Mykola Halahan, a veteran Ukrainian Marx-
ism. Halahan had already received a sympathetic response in the social-
ist daily Nepszava toward coverage of the Ukrainian question. The inter-
est of the left reached a new level with formation of the Soviet govern-
ment. 143 The Soviet government recognised the West Ukrainian Peoples 
Republic, establishing trade links and negotiations on aid in its war with 
Poland. The Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs Erno Pór 
promptly initiated discussions with Halahan, who advised him that the 
destiny of soviet power in Hungary was dependent on the plight of Uk-
raine, as long as the confl ict with the UNR continued “assistance from 
Mos cow will not come, because between Moscow and Budapest lies Uk-
raine.”144 The Hungarian government, proposed Halahan, should not 
simply consult but demand from Moscow an end to the war with Uk raine. 
Bela Kun followed up these talks emphasising the necessity of a So-
viet Ukraine and seeing no need for peace with the “bourgeois Direc-
tory”. Halahan in turn sought to convince Kun it was not possible to im-
pose the Russian model, that the Ukrainians did support a form of state 
which corresponding to the interests of the working masses, the “labour 
councils”.145 In this regard Kun’s disdain of Rakovsky became apparent, 
describing him repeatedly as an “idiot”. In Hungary he said communists 
were able to work with the social-democrats, because the national ques-
142 Rudolf Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Stanford 1967, Rev-
olution in Perspective, Essay on the Hungarian Revolution, Ed. Andrew C Janos, 
Berkley,1971. Rudolf L.Tokés, p. 201.
143 Mykola Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, 1880 ti 1920 r, Tempora, Kyiv, 2005, p. 419.
144 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, p. 442
145 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv 443 
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tion did not divide them into warring camps. Kun’s solution was an “in-
dependent Soviet Ukraine” and proposed establishing contact with those 
adhering to that viewpoint – Vynnychenko the former premier of the 
UNR was the fi gure they identifi ed to take this forward.146 Confi dent 
Lenin now supported an independent Ukraine Kun agreed to take on 
the role as mediator in achieving this outcome in all their interests. 
By the middle of March 1919, Vynnychenko was in Vienna having bro-
ken with Directory and the rightist leaders of the USDRP. Whilst he had 
begun to advocate the creation of a state based on workers and peasants 
soviets, he continued to have misgivings about the Bolsheviks. In his diary 
he asked whether their victory and the creation of the socialist order, ‘the 
birth of which I welcome with ecstasy in my soul’, would also mean defeat 
or the Ukrainians, enthused by events in Hungary he placed his hope 
on the success of international revolution.147 On 28 March, mere week 
after the Soviet Republic was formed; Vynnychenko received a telegram 
asking him to go to the Budapest, Kun even provided the transport. 
On 30 March Vynnychenko arrived in Budapest with another Social 
Democrat, Yury Tyshchenko, and he met Kun on the same day. The en-
suing discussion between the émigrés Ukrainians and the Hungarian of-
fi cials resulted in a programme drawn up by Vynnychenko and Tyshchen-
ko which was presented by Kun to Moscow, the were: 
1. Fully independent and sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Republic within the eth-
nographic borders including Galicia with Lviv as per the line of the Syan and 
the Kuban region. 
2. until its establishment on a All-European scale, the establishment of a mili-
tary alliance between the existing socialist republics on the grounds of equal 
rights of each member of the alliance.
3. The military of another member of the alliance should remain on the terri-
tory of a member of the alliance only with the consent of that Soviet republic.
4. The Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to consist of the Inde-
pendentist Ukrainian Social Democrats, the left Ukrainian Social-Revolu-
146 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv 444
147 Shchodennyk. Tom 1, 1911–1920, ed. Hryhorii Kostiuk, Edmonton and New York, 
1980, Ibid., pp. 323–28. The quotation is on p. 328.
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tionaries, and Ukrainian communists as well as those Ukrainian socialist par-
ties who accept the platform of soviet power. 
5 All allied socialist republics are obliged to if necessary provide render all 
material aid to another member-republic in defence of its territory in the fi ght 
against imperialist encroachments on behalf of neighbouring bourgeois coun-
tries and in the fi rst place against the Entente, Poland and Romania, as well 
as the fi ght against internal counter revolutionaries which endanger the ex-
istence of Soviet republics.148 
Kun assured Vynnychenko that he had been in contact with to Lenin by 
radio and he accepted the points: ‘But concerning the government, then 
it would depend on who is chosen by the councils of workers and peasant 
deputies of Ukraine.’149 The full text of this radio telegram was intercep-
ted by a Paris radio station and was published in full in the French news-
papers; the “Triple alliance of Russian, Ukrainian and Hungarian soviet 
republics” caused uproar as a new red plot. But from Moscow there was 
silence. 
The only news was of continuing unrest, Vynnychenko felt the Rakovs-
ky government was turning the ‘Ukrainian peasantry and all national 
Uk rainian layers’ against itself, posing a serious danger ‘especially bear-
ing in mind the necessity as soon as possible to constitute a direct con-
nection with Hungary’.150 It was a week before Budapest received a re-
sponse. – It was not from Lenin but Rakovsky. Vynnychenko was not named 
but sarcastically described as that “poet” who was a “typical representa-
tive of petit bourgeois ideology” who belongs to the left-wing of the “Di-
rectory band”.151 With whom there was no sense in discussing any kind 
of alliances. It was not what Por and Kun had expected, they were said 
Halahan “baffl ed” in light of the plight of Soviet Hungary.
Vynnychenko met again with Kun and Por, but they made no progress 
with Rakovsky.152 They vehemently believed that Moscow and Kyiv would 
148 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, 445- 446
149 Volodomyr Vynnychenko, Schodennyk 1911–1920, Edmonton, 1980, p. 331-332.
150 Vynnychenko, Schodennyk, p. 331-332.
151 Halahan Z Moïkh spomyniv p. 446. 
152 Vynnychenko, Schodennyk, p. 331.
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agree, when Vynnychenko expressed his doubts they protested: “Never 
in the world, Russian communists cannot be imperialists and national-
ists.” Vynnychenko said to them: “Mark my words: They will lose you, us 
and themselves on the Ukrainian question.”153 Exasperated, Vynny chen-
ko returned to Vienna, leaving Halahan to represent him.
Vynnychenko and Kun were not the only people that April calling for 
reconciliation with the Ukrainian parties to overcome the Rakovsky gov-
ernments ‘complete isolation from the masses.’154 As On 17 April Red Ar -
my commander on the Ukrainian front Antonov-Ovseenko under orders 
on 25 March to go on the offensive towards southeastern Galicia and es-
tablish ties with Soviet Hungary, raised his concerns with the Bolshevik 
leadership that he was hindered because “land and national policy in Uk-
raine cuts at the roots of the military leadership to overcome these disin-
tegrating infl uences”. His proposals including a coalition government 
with the “Nezalezhnik SD’s and Ukrainian SR’s”, “to compel foreigners ‘Great 
Russians’ to adjust themselves with greatest tact towards the local popula-
tion” and “to halt the plundering of Ukraine’s bread and coal”. 155
All these demands brought no change in the policy in Ukraine, Kun be-
came convinced that Rakovsky was engaged in outright sabotage, despite 
Lenin repeated reassurances this was not the case he was not convinced 
otherwise. This failure did not cease the interest of the Hungarian gov-
ernment in the Ukrainian question, indeed whilst dissident Uk rai nian 
Marxists were being branded “counter-revolutionary” in Kyiv, in Bu da-
pest they had freedom to organise. A Ukrainian Communist Group was 
organised and began publishing a weekly Chervona Ukraina on from 24 
May.156 It critical articles on the great disagreement in the international 
communist family caused some consternation with the authorities; as a 
result one Russian and one Pole were imposed on the editorial staff. 157
153 Vynnychenko, Schodennyk, 335.
154 Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Selected Works of Vsevolod 
Holubnychy, Soviet Regional Economics, 1982, p. 75.
155 Adams, Bolsheviks in Ukraine, 266.
156 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, p 454 
157 Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, p 455
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The Ukrainian Kronstadt – The Nezalezhnyky rebellion
From the time the USDRP (Nezalezhnyky) leaders were released by the Che-
ka in early April their own situation and that of the country as a whole went 
from bad to worse. The harassment of their party continued unabated.158 
But this situation was changing rapidly; there had been a rash of strikes 
in March by impoverished workers who perceived the Bolsheviks had de-
parted from their principles of self-management, whilst the number of 
pea sant revolt soared to a total of 328 between 1 April – 15 June 1919.159 
As Kopanivsky reported in Chervony Prapor: “The food detachments have 
made the peasants discontented, just as those of the Hetman and the 
Germans did. These detachments have not only shot people and forci-
bly taken bread, but villages have revolted and killed detachments.160
The decision of the Nezalezhnyky to start ‘fi ghting between the Rus-
sian Bolsheviks and Ukrainian Bolsheviks’ appears closely related to the 
mutiny of the First Kyiv Soviet Division.161 The cause of the breach be-
tween their comrade Zeleny and the KP(b)U authorities was their deci-
sion to refuse the redistribution of the land of large sugar factories sought 
by the peasants. This fed into disagreements over their status as a regi-
ment of the Red Army; Chervony Prapor, reporting that: ‘Zeleny stood 
and stands on the Soviet platform. The reason for the misunderstand-
ing is Zeleny’s unwillingness to meld into one with the Red Army, and 
Antonov knows why he is unwilling.’162 It was one of numerous such ‘mis-
understandings’ amongst Ukrainian units arising from Rakovsky’s re-
neging on assurances they would maintain their autonomy as part of a Uk-
rainian Red Army within an independent Republic.163 An offi cial press 
158 Yu. Mazurneko whilst under arrest by the Cheka read he had been arrested in 
connection to the uprising led by Sokolovskii and others. After being released he 
was faced with the reality that some members of his party were participated in 
the uprising. Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
159 S. Ripetsky, Encyclopaedia of Ukraine, Brovkin, Workers Unrest, Slavic Review, 
p. 358. 
160 Chervony Prapor, 16, April 1919
161 Elias Tcherikover, The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1919, New York, 1965, p. 373.
162 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
163 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
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campaign began against Zeleny, whilst on 8 March the Kyivskyi Komunist 
wrote with satisfaction that ‘Otaman Zeleny and his army, deployed in the 
region of Obukhiv, Hermanivka and Trypillia, maintains soviet power’, a 
week later the same paper was boasting ‘Zeleny is fi nally being liquidat-
ed.’ 164 
On 10 April the Nezalezhnyky concluded a draft agreement in Kyiv 
with the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and representatives 
of the ‘offi cial USDRP’ for the ‘organization of the uprising of the toiling 
masses of Ukraine against the occupiers’.165 The aim was to establish a 
new Council of the Republic composed of representatives from each party, 
to lead a struggle to organize a people’s government based on workers 
and peasants soviets. 
The policy of the parties signing this agreement, both in the Council of the 
Republic and in other organs of state power, must be built on the following 
principles: 1. Strengthening and defence of the independence and autono-
my of the national Ukrainian Republic; 2. Establishment of the government 
of the Toiling People (excluding elements which exploit the work of others); 
3. Organization of the national economy in the interests of the toiling mass-
es and a planned transition from the capitalist order to the socialist, with the 
immediate expropriation of non-working landed property.166
According to this ambitious plan, the struggle was to begin simultane-
ously throughout Ukraine; on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR by a 
Central Revolutionary Committee, on the territory of the UNR by the 
Council of the Republic, which would replace the Directory.167 
The Nezalezhnyky ran into problems from the start. The Borotbistsy 
was not prepared to break with Rakovsky government and condemned 
164 It is worth noting that Antonov complained of the manner the press wrote of in-
surgents describing articles as works of ‘fi ction’. M. Malet, Makhno and his En-
emies, META, 
165 After the UPSR Left changed its name to the ‘Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revo-
lutionaries (Communist) Borotbist’ at its Congress in March, the UPSR Central 
Current in April 1919 abandoned the addition ‘Central Current’ and called itself 
simply the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries.
166 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
167 Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
INDEPENDENTIST UKRAINIAN MARXIST AND SOVIET HUNGARY • 209
the ‘reckless escapades’ of the Nezalezhnyky.168 The idea did not rest easy 
with all Nezalezhnyky either, at a party conference in Kyiv on 22 April, 
a small group led by Hukovych and Pankiv opposed a rebellion.169 They 
split forming the ‘USDRP(Nezalezhnyky) Left’ and began publishing the 
legal daily Chervonyi Styah.170 Along with the Borotbisty and the KPU(b)
U they later signed a joint statement charging Otaman Hryhoriiv’s re-
bellion in the South as ‘betraying the revolution’.171 
Having played their hand events escalated when on 30 April the Cen-
tral Committee of the KP(b)U decided to ‘arrest and bring to trial for 
counter revolutionary activities all members of the Nezalezhnyky party, 
regardless of their point of view’.172 Not waiting for other parties the Ne-
zalezhnyky established an All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee led by 
Yu. Mazurenko, Richtytsky, Avdiyenko and Antin Drahomyretsky, with a 
Supreme Insurgent Council of Mazurenko and Richtytsky, their principle 
armed force was the First Kyiv Soviet Division under Otaman Zeleny. 
Basing itself in the town of Skvyr the Nezalezhnyky Revkom began to 
issue a series of proclamations the most famous being ‘Order no.48’ call-
ing for a ‘struggle against the betrayers of the toiling masses’, the ‘occu-
pation government of Rakovsky,’ and for the arrest of the ‘traitorous Di-
rectory, which is negotiating with the French and other imperialists.’173 
In their armed struggle the Nezalezhnyky openly stood on the ground 
of the Bolsheviks, it was not so much a struggle against Soviet Ukraine 
but a struggle for power within the Ukrainian SSR. Explaining the ris-
ing to the Comintern the Nezalezhnyky wrote:
The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee’s task was to seize power quickly 
in the main centres of Ukraine and to pro claim an independent Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, ex pecting in this way to’ forestall the seizure of the 
Ukraine by Petlyura, demoralise his army, and thereby attract to their side 
168 Blakitny used precisely these words in telegram to Hryhoriiv, Adams, Bolsheviks 
in Ukraine, p. 234.
169 Maistrenko, Borotbism, p. 139.
170 Chervonyi Styah [The Red Standard], Lawryenko, An Annotated Bibliograo-
phy,133
171 Bilshovyk, 13, May 1919, Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p 137-139
172 Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p 130-132.
173 Signed by Drahomyretsky, Dybichenko, Selyanskyi, Vlasivskyi, Syrotenko, Secre-
tary: Didych. Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p 125-126. 
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his revolutionary but nationally oriented units. On the other hand, the All-
Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee aimed at forcing the Russian commu-
nists to change their attitude on the Ukrainian question, and to come to an 
agreement with it by the very fact of establishing a really Ukrainian Soviet 
government.174
The Nezalezhnyky uprising though larger than the Kronstadt insurrection 
of 1921 has remained undistinguished from the wider Ukrainian ‘ja c que-
rie’.175 Yet it was indeed historically unique in that the Bolsheviks were 
challenged not only by the demand for freely elected soviets, but by a 
Marxist party committed to social revolution. 
The uprising spread rapidly within three or four weeks the Revkom 
ruled more or less constantly several districts of the Right Bank, whilst 
the insurgent otaman’s Sokolovsky, Anhel and Yuri Tiutiunnyk were al so 
associated with the Nezalezhnyky. The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Com-
mittee formed a Central Rebel Committee after the addition to it of rep-
resentatives of the UPSR and the Peasant Union from the end of June. 
According to Bolsheviks descriptions the rebel camp numbered 25,000, 
though others put it at between 5,000-10,000.176 Buoyed by their initial 
success Yurko Mazurenko, commander of the insurgents sent an ultima-
tum to Rakovsky, which began:
In the name of the insurgent Ukrainian toiling people I announce to you 
that the workers and peasants of Ukraine have risen up against you, as the 
government of the Russian conquerors, which, having draped itself in slogans 
that are sacred to us: 1. a government of soviets of workers and peasants, 2. 
the self-determination of peoples, including secession, and 3. the struggle 
against imperialist conquerors and plunderers of the toiling masses, dese-
crates not only these sacred slogans and destroys the real government of the 
workers and independent peasants of a neighbouring state, but accuses them 
for aims that are far from any socialist system.177
174 Richtysky,‘Memorandum Ukrainskoi Kumunistichnoi, Dokumenty Ukrainskoho 
Komunizmu, p. 45-66 
175 Indeed many of the Kronstadt rebels were Ukrainian recruits enrolled in autumn 
1920 infl uenced by the very ideas of the insurgency of 1919.
176 Elias Tcherikover, The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1919, New York, 1965, p. 250, 
177 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
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Rakovsky was given 24 hours to transfer power to the All-Ukrainian Re-
vo lutionary Committee and withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine. It 
was in Mazurenko’s own words their ‘swan song’. Having at fi rst believed 
that they had taken the leadership of the spontaneous movement, events 
started to prove otherwise. 
The Nezalezhnyky had been led to believe that there had been a change 
in the composition of the Directory of the UNR, ‘that the reactionary 
wing had left, and that a new cabinet composed of socialists was nomi-
nated, which supports Soviet authority’. But this was not the case. A new 
government had been formed in Rivne on 9 April, it was dominated by 
the right-wing of the USDRP, headed by Borys Martos and with Petlyura 
still head of the Directory.178 In a joint letter of the CC of the USDRP 
and UPSR to the rebel groups on 20 May they repeated many of their 
previous arguments characterising the ‘intention of some parties (Left 
SRs and SD Nezalezhnyky) to establish some sort of Ukrainian commu-
nism is a complete fantasy.’179
The offi cial USDRP refused to accept that the CC members who re-
mained in Kyiv could make such an agreement.180 With the Army of the 
UNR starting to make advances, an ‘additional agreement’ was made in 
Chorny Ostriv on 9 June. The Nezalezhnyky were sidelined with an as-
surance of legal existence, on the condition of loyalty to a USDRP-UPSR 
government.181 The entrance of the UPSR’s into the government caused 
signifi cant disorientation in the insurgent movement, agitators were dis-
patched into rebel areas to undermine the Nezalezhnyky led Revkom and 
to subordinate rebel units to Petlyura. The lack of defi nite information 
178 There is confusion as to whether the socialists in the Directory’s government even 
new about the agreement made in Kyiv, Mazepa states the CC of the USDRP re-
fused to recognise the right of those members who were in Kyiv to make such an 
agreement on their behalf.
179 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
180 Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine p 46, p. 431.
181 implemented with the following additions: 1. Organs of local power must be or-
ganized on the labour principle; 2. All parties (in particular the USDRP Nezal-
ezhnyky), which stand for the defense of Ukraine’s independence, must be legal-
ized on the condition that they do not oppose the government with armed force; 
3. This additional agreement must be transmitted by the government of the Di-
rectory.’
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created further illusions that the entry of the UPSR’s into the govern-
ment was on the basis of the original Kyiv agreement. 
Meanwhile the forces commanded by Zeleny suffered serious defeat 
in a four day battle between Obukhov and Tripilii in early July. Zaleny 
retreated towards Uman, whilst the Supreme Insurgent Council of Ma-
zurenko forced to abandon its operations towards Kyiv fought their way 
through to Kamyanets on 18 July. 
The rebels were met in Kamyanets with a welcoming rally being or-
ganized, but behind the scenes the moderate and conservatives were un-
easy with these ‘Ukrainian Bolsheviks’. The USDRP(Nez) were also re-
viewing their position, an extended meeting was held on 18–19 July with 
a clear picture of the political complexion of the Directory’s government 
they considered previous information had been ‘a provocation by duplic-
itous groups aiming to destroy the infl uence of Nezalezhnyky’, that ‘SR-
SD, and later Petlyuraite-Denikinite, agitation caused a split in the rebel 
movement and a counter-revolutionary spirit and tendency’. As opposed 
to reconstituting Soviet power the situation ‘had worked to the benefi t of 
counter-revolution’. Mazurenko concluded: 
The party overrated its strength, misread objective conditions and the con-
sequences that could result from its false step, and was forced to concede de-
feat and to withdraw with its remaining force.182
Faced with the prospect of the Russian Volunteer Army replacing Rako-
vsky’s government, they issued a proclamation explaining their withdraw-
al and condemned the tactics of the uprising in a subsequent article in 
Chervony Prapor they explained their participation:
Some Nezalezhnyky organizations assumed the task of giving the rebel move-
ment the ideological content of a struggle against the occupation policy of 
the Soviet government in Ukraine. They wanted to force the Soviet govern-
ment to change its tactics but, lacking the strength to master the movement, 
were themselves beaten out of it by the Petlyurite counter-revolution, which 
itself was beaten by Denikin’s counter-revolutionary army.183 
182 Mazurenko Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini, p. 248-253.
183 Chervony prapor, no. 63, 25 December 1919.
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Concerned by the presence of the Nezalezhnyky and encouraged by at-
tacks on the ‘Ukrainian Bolsheviks’ in the offi cial USDRP press, Petlyu-
ra’s counter-espionage surrounded the rebel units, disarmed them and 
arrested Mazurenko, Tkachenko, Richytsky and others.184 A rebel com-
mander, Diiachenko was secretly shot without trial and his body thrown 
in a fi eld. Those arrested were also to be shot, but the UPSRs threatened 
to break with the government and demanded the immediate release of 
the arrested. After several days the arrested UPSRs were released, but 
the Nezalezhnyky remained captives. It was only after 38 days that Pet-
lyura’s agents agreed to release them in the hope of gaining their sup-
port in the confl ict with Denikin. 
The Ancien Regime and breakdown of the Ukrainian Republics
In the summer of 1919 the Ukrainian SSR went into meltdown, the re-
fusal of the KP(b)U to cooperate with other parties, contributed to their 
crisis. When they engaged in unity with some of the Borotbisty in May it was 
too little, too late. This disintegration changed the correlation of power 
between the Red Army and the Russian Volunteer Army, resulting in its 
occupation of large areas of Ukraine. 
The breakdown of the Ukrainian SSR provided for a revival of the UNR, 
whose army arrived at Kyiv at the same time as Denikin. The offi cial USDRP 
saw it as a victory over the Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks ‘‘history, 
as we foresaw, went according to Marx and not according to Lenin’185 Yet 
despite circumstances which appeared favourable to the parties of the 
UNR, they did not gain hegemony of the popular resistance to Denikin. 
184 The moderate USDRP declared: ‘We did not believe what seemed to us absurd, 
that the peasants wanted to exchange strong Russian Bolsheviks for a sickly ̀ Uk-
rai nian bolshevism’ of those, who began ad hoc to call themselves left SRs or Ne-
zalezhnyky... We declared to the Chief Staff and to the All-Ukrainian Revolution-
ary Committee that they had become the victims of self-deception. The peasants 
rose up not for any Ukrainian soviet power, but in their own interests, both social 
and national’. The Nezalezhnyky were accused of threatening to execute ‘those 
who agitated for the people’s government and Otaman Petlyura.’ Vyzvolennia, 
25, July 1919 Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materially, IV.
185 Robitnycha Hazeta, 25, August 1919. 
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It became the point of the fi nal political degeneration of the UNR played 
out in their encounter with Denikin. 
Conclusion
In revisiting the role of the Ukrainian Marxists in the Ukrainian revolu-
tion it is necessary to recognise that vernacular current’ has fallen victim 
to the prevalent paradigms that have dominated historiography for seven 
decades.186 
On the one hand the offi cial Soviet history which served as a source 
of legitimacy for the system. This considered that the revolution in Uk-
rai ne had no independent aspect and presented the Russian Bolsheviks 
in the leading role of the entire revolutionary process of 1917–1920. The 
omega can be found in the literature of the national paradigm developed 
mainly, though not exclusively, by Ukrainian émigrés. It gives the na-
tional dimension primary place to the detriment and subordination of 
social questions. What is often overlooked is the similarity of the two pa-
ra digms: traits considered negative in one are portrayed positively in the 
other. This is notable in the treatment of the socialist element of the Uk-
rai nian Revolution. Both orthodoxies put emphasis on their more mod-
erate tendency as if it were their overall character and demean the rela-
tive infl uence of the vernacular revolutionary left.187 Both also share a con-
ception of continuity in history running from Lenin, Stalin to the collapse 
of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991.
One criticism made of the radical Ukrainian parties by the national 
is that whilst the contest remained an internal affair they were defeated 
by their moderate socialist rivals; evidence of this is seen in the revival of 
the UNR in late 1918, not the soviet republic they envisaged. The balance 
186 John-Paul Himka,, ‘The National and the Social in the Ukrainian Revolution of 
1917-20: The Historiographical Agenda.’ Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 34,1994: 
95-110. Edward Acton,, ‘The Revolution and its Historians’, 1-17, in Acton, E Cher-
niaev V, Rosenberg, W, eds, Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914–
1921, London, 1997
187 An example of this is Reshetar who writes that the USDRP saw Marxism as a me-
rely a ‘means by which national independence could be achieved’, The Uk rai-
nian Revolution 1917–1920, p. 51
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was shifted towards them by the Russian Red Army.188 In fact in 1919 the 
Bolsheviks could not have attained power without a shift internally. 
The Ukrainian peasants rapidly went into opposition to the Directory 
to Petlyura’s evaporating forces. A string of additional partisan brigades 
actively supported the soviet platform of the Borotbisty and Nezalezhny-
ky.189 The Red Army which advanced on Kyiv its ranks were swollen by 
Ukrainian troops who went over en masse, seeing in the revolt the means 
by which to realize their social aspirations so neglected by the Directory.190
In spring 1919 the creation of a Ukrainian republic based workers ad 
peasants self-government with a plurality of pro-soviet parties was a vi-
able possibility. Why was their conception of Ukraine not realized? An 
explanation can be found by the unresolved contradiction between the 
internal and the external of elements of the revolution. The tendency of the 
internal forces was apparent in the struggle of the Central Rada for self-
government, in the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian People’s 
Republic; and in the striving to create an independent Soviet Republic. 
In contrast, the tendency of the external forces was to subordinate Uk rai-
ne to Russia and retard the internal forces.191 It is was a striking exam-
ple of a clash between what Hal Draper later described as the, the dem-
ocratic conception of ‘socialism from below’ versus the elitist conception of 
‘socialism from above’.192 This overarching confl ict was exacerbated by the 
existence of a dual centre inside Ukraine which fomented instability in 
the social revolution. 
The rift that grew within the left stemmed not only from dissatisfac-
tion with policy on the national question but an overall absence of self-
government. The resulting rebellions most popular demand was that of 
democratically elected soviets. Ivan Maistrenko considers that the Bolshe-
188 Amongst others this is the assessment of George Luckyj in his foreword to Borot-
bism in the 1954, New York edition.
189 Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni I buri revolutsii 1917–1921, Vol.I, p. 28, Arthur Adams, 
The Bolsheviks In The Ukraine The Second Campaign, 1918–1919, New Haven 
1963, p. 120-123, Even the Sich Rifl eman, considered the staunchest of the Uk-
rai nian regiments, declared their support for the soviet platform in March.
190 Adams, i The Bolsheviks In The Ukraine p. 93
191 Richtysky, Memorandum Ukrainskoi Kumunistichnoi Partii, p. 58-59.
192 Hal Draper, Socialism From Below, Centre for Socialist History, Almeda, USA, 
2001, p. 1-33. 
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viks had ‘more chances than the Jacobins to continue the national revo-
lution, in other words to organize the creative impetus of the masses which 
was directed towards the construction of a new society’.193 One such op-
portunity was in the calls in 1919 for the reconstitution of Soviet Ukraine 
as a genuinely independent and self-governing republic echoed the Hun-
garian Soviet Republic. Lenin wrote that the “Hungarian proletarian rev-
olution is helping even the blind to see.”194 This enlightenment didn’t reach 
Rakovsky’s or Lenin. 195 The opportunity was lost. The Romanian and Po-
lish Armies closed the road to Hungary. From Budapest Bela Kun wrote 
to Lenin telling him that: ‘Forcing Rakovsky on the Ukrainians against 
their wishes, in my opinion, will be an irreparable mistake’.196 
The experience of this and preceding episodes brings into question 
the long accepted explanation for the fate of the Russian Revolution: the 
primary role of external factors in its degeneration and rise of Stalin-
ism. Coupled with this assessment is the contention that unfavourable 
circumstances restricted the choices available to the Bolsheviks. Yet the 
idea that the one-party state in Russia arose from a lack of potential al-
lies cannot explain events in Ukraine. Here the Borotbisty, unlike the Rus-
sian Left-SRs, did not go over to open revolt; indeed many of the other 
socialists who did were in part pushed by a situation created by the Rus-
sian Communists themselves.197 They denied Ukraine the opportunity 
of a multi-party democracy based on the rule of the soviets. 
For the Bolsheviks, socialism could not be developed in a single, iso-
lated, backward country such as Russia without the aid of the more de-
veloped countries of Europe. Their project was predicated on extending 
193 Babenko (Maistrenko), Bolshevist Bonapartism, Nasha Borotba, Geneva, 1948, 
p. 6.
194 V. I. Lenin, Greetings to the Hungarian Workers, Pravda, May 29, 1919 Lenin’s 
Collected Works, (4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 Vol-
ume 29), 387-391.
195 Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Soviet Regional Economics 
Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy, 75.
196 Cable sent 8, July 1919, Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, p. 
202.
197 V. A. Chyrko, Krakh ideolohii ta polityky natsionalistychnoi partii ukapistiv, Uk-
rai nskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, Kyiv, no.12 (1968) p. 24
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the revolution westward. The entire approach of socialism-from-above in 
Ukraine contributed to undermining the very perspective on which the 
October Revolution was based. 
What is striking about this key juncture is that despite despair with 
the Bolsheviks there was not a collapse or decline in support for the so-
viet idea. Indeed the opposite occurred. In the case of the Borotbisty, hav-
ing re-launched as the ‘Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty)’ they wit-
nessed a surge in support enabling the Red Army to repulse Denikin’s 
offensive into central Russia.198 
One explanation for this mobilization is that it was based on a choice 
between restoration and resistance; this however does not fully explain 
Ukraine. This poses again the contention discussed above that whilst the 
contest remained an internal affair the pro-soviet groups lost to their 
more moderate rivals. Yet despite circumstances which would appear most 
favourable to the parties of the remnant UNR, they did not gain hegem-
ony of the popular resistance in the winter of 1920. Yet such was the scale 
of insurgency in the winter of 1919–1920 that Denikin committed as ma ny 
troops against Ukrainian partisans as against the Russian Red Army it-
self. This vice broke the Volunteer Army, bringing a decisive military and 
political turn in the revolution. But the surge of 1920 which defeated the 
Russian Volunteer Army could not re-create March 1919, as Vynny chen-
ko concluded in his Rebirth of a Nation, if their plan had been accepted 
and a common soviet front established the Hungarian Republic of Coun-
cils and government in Bavaria would have been saved. 199
198 A Volunteer army spy reported on the mood in threatened Petrograd: ‘The work-
er elements, at least a large section of them, are still Bolshevik inclined. Like some 
other democratic elements, they see the regime although bad as their own…Psy-
chologically, they identify the present with equality and Soviet power and the Whites 
with the old regime and its scorn of the masses.’ Orlando Figes,, A People’s Trag-
edy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924, Pimlico, 1996, p. 675.
199 Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhenia Natsii, III:, p321.
